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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction and Background 
 
Audit Objectives  Members of the South Carolina General Assembly asked the Legislative 
Audit Council (LAC) to conduct an audit of the S.C. Department of 
Commerce (DOC). The requestors had concerns about the effectiveness 
and transparency of discretionary economic incentive programs overseen 
by DOC. 
 
We conducted survey work at the agency, reviewed relevant documentation, 
and consulted with the primary audit requestors to clarify and define issues 
for review. We also identified other areas to be included in our review. 
Our audit objectives are as follows: 
 
 Review the process for awarding incentives to determine the validity 
of the process. 
 Examine processes for monitoring compliance by companies with 
the terms of the incentives. 
 Evaluate the effectiveness and transparency of the incentives administered 
by DOC to determine whether desired results were achieved. 
 Evaluate the accuracy and appropriateness of methodologies for 







The period of our review was generally 2009 through 2019, with 
consideration of earlier and more recent periods when relevant. To conduct 
this audit, we used a variety of sources of evidence, including the following: 
 
 Interviews with DOC employees, employees of other state agencies, 
and interested parties. 
 DOC policies and procedures. 
 DOC publications, press releases, and internal reports. 
 State laws and regulations. 
 DOC incentive package files. 
 Information from other states’ departments of commerce or like 
agencies. 
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 Criteria used to measure performance included state laws, best practices, 
agency regulation and policies, and agency performance measures. 
We also interviewed staff regarding information systems used by DOC. 
We determined how the data was maintained and what the various levels 
of control were. We determined that DOC’s computer systems have controls 
in place and noted possible areas for improvement. 
 
We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. Those generally accepted government 
auditing standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
 
S.C. Code §2-15-50(b)(2) requires us to review the effectiveness of an 
agency to determine if it should be continued, revised, or eliminated. 
We did not conclude from this review that the S.C. Department of 
Commerce should be eliminated; however, our audit includes 
recommendations for improvement in several areas. 
 
 
Background  The primary focus of this report is to examine discretionary economic 
development incentives administered by the S.C. Department of Commerce 
(DOC). DOC is a cabinet agency that is responsible for promoting economic 
development in South Carolina. Discretionary incentives administered by 
DOC include tax credits and grants that are not offered to all businesses, 
but are instead only offered to businesses that obtain approval from the 
Coordinating Council for Economic Development (Coordinating Council). 
 
DOC employs staff that support the Coordinating Council. Established by 
S.C. Code §13-1-1710, the Coordinating Council consists of the: 
 
1. Secretary of Commerce, who also serves as the chairman. 
2. Director of the S.C. Department of Revenue. 
3. Chairman of the S.C. Public Service Authority (Santee Cooper). 
4. Commissioner of Agriculture. 
5. Secretary of the S.C. Department of Transportation. 
6. Director of the S.C. Department of Parks, Recreation and Tourism. 
7. Chairman of the S.C. Research Authority. 
8. Chairman of the State Board for Technical and Comprehensive 
Education. 
9. Chairman of the S.C. Ports Authority. 
10. Director of the S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce. 
11. Chairman of the S.C. Jobs Economic Development Authority. 
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The DOC staff who provide support to the Coordinating Council are housed 
in DOC’s grants administration division. Based on the recommendations of 
the DOC staff, the full Coordinating Council approves discretionary 
incentives for businesses. The incentives awarded by the Coordinating 




Job Development Credits  
JDCs are tax rebates that businesses can take against their employee 
withholdings on their quarterly state withholding tax returns, in order to 
offset the cost of qualifying and eligible expenditures. JDCs were created 
pursuant to the Enterprise Zone Act of 1995. Companies must apply to the 
Coordinating Council to receive JDCs. The JDC program is administered 
by the staff of DOC. 
 
Applications for JDCs are reviewed and approved by a subcommittee 
of the Coordinating Council known as the enterprise program committee. 
After being approved by the enterprise committee, JDCs are administered 
pursuant to a revitalization agreement (RVA) executed between the 
Coordinating Council and a qualifying business. The RVA specifies 
the number of jobs the company must create and the amount of capital 
investment the company must make in order to claim the JDC. 
Per S.C. Code §12-10-80(A)(7), the Coordinating Council must approve 
of a company’s documentation that the minimum job and capital investment 
requirements have been met before a JDC can be claimed.  
 
Companies have five years to complete their investment and job creation 
requirements. Once a company completes its investment and job creation 
requirements and submits documentation confirming the attainment of these 
requirements to the Coordinating Council, the Coordinating Council 
certifies that the company may begin receiving its JDC reimbursement on a 
quarterly basis. Companies usually receive reimbursements over a 10-year 
period, though some larger projects may involve reimbursements up to a 
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The amount that a company can claim as a JDC depends on two primary 
factors: 
  
1.  Wages for the new jobs. 
If the new jobs pay over $25.94 per hour, the company can claim a 
maximum JDC equal to 5% of the taxable wages for those jobs. 
Companies can claim a maximum of 2% to 4% based upon a sliding 
scale of taxable wages for jobs that pay $25.94 or less per hour. 
 
2.  Location of the project. 
Companies that locate in less economically developed counties in 
South Carolina can claim a higher percentage of the maximum amount 
of JDCs. For the purpose of determining JDCs, South Carolina’s 
46 counties are classified into four tiers. The counties with a combination 
of the highest unemployment and lowest per capita income are classified 
as Tier IV counties while counties with a combination of the lowest 
unemployment and highest per capita income are classified as Tier I 
counties.  
 
Table 1.1 shows that companies with projects in Tier IV counties can claim 
100% of the maximum JDC while companies with projects located in Tier I 
counties can receive 55% of the maximum JDC. Counties are classified into 
the four tiers every year; a list of the counties in each tier for 2020 can be 
found in Appendix A. The remaining portion of JDCs from Tier I, II, and III 




Table 1.1: County Classification 











Source: S.C. Code §12-10-80(D)(1) 
 
 
In its annual report on the enterprise zone program, the Coordinating 
Council provided the following example of the calculation of the JDC value 
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Table 1.2: Sample Calculation of 
the JDC Value for a Company 

















Source: Coordinating Council for Economic Development 
 
 
To claim JDCs, a company must incur qualified expenditures as specified in 
the RVA. Pursuant to S.C. Code §12-10-80(C)(3), qualified expenditures 
can include, among other things: 
 
 Training costs. 
 Real estate acquisition and improvements. 
 Improvements to public and private utility systems. 
 Fixed transportation facilities, including highway and rail. 
 
According to the Coordinating Council, the eligible expenditures for the 
JDC program are meant to represent investments that will stay in 
South Carolina. Thus, moveable expenses such as machinery, furniture, 
and personal property, while allowable for overall project costs, are not 
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In addition to the JDCs, the Coordinating Council approves grants for 
specific economic development projects and are awarded to the counties in 
which the businesses reside. Businesses are required to meet certain job 
creation and capital investment goals and are reimbursed through the 
counties with grant funds as the grant projects are completed. The grants 
are awarded pursuant to a grant award agreement that specifies the 
requirements. 
 
The grants are financed by three separate funds, with their total amounts 
listed in Table 1.3: 
 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SET-ASIDE FUND 
The intended use of the set-aside fund is established by S.C. Code 
§12-28-2910. Pursuant to state law, $20 million is deposited in the 
economic development set-aside fund annually. Monies from this fund 
are derived from a utility tax. Projects funded by the set-aside fund 
include site preparation, water and sewer projects, and road construction.  
 
GOVERNOR’S CLOSING FUND 
The Governor’s Closing Fund is funded by annual appropriations and, 
pursuant to proviso, transfers from other economic development funds. 
Pursuant to proviso, the closing fund is meant to “provide maximum 
flexibility and encourage the creation of new jobs and capital 
investment.”  
 
RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE FUND 
The remaining portion of JDCs from Tier I, II, and III counties are 
deposited in the Coordinating Council’s rural infrastructure fund (RIF). 
Pursuant to S.C. Code §12-10-85, the main purpose of the RIF is to 
provide financial assistance for local governments in less economically 
developed counties to develop infrastructure and economic development 
activities. Grants from the RIF support activities such as improvements to 
public and private water and sewer systems, site preparation, and 
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Table 1.3: Total Business 
Development Grants Awarded 
by Funding Source,  







Set‐Aside Fund  302  $150,319,231  $497,746 
Rural Infrastructure Fund  210  78,775,385  375,121 
Governor’s Closing Fund  109  243,139,983  2,230,642 
Combinations of Funds*      4  17,350,000  4,337,500 
TOTAL  625  $489,584,599  $783,335 
 
*The combinations of funds all occurred in calendar year 2010. 
 
Source: Coordinating Council for Economic Development 
 
 
Impact of COVID-19 
Pandemic 
 
The drafts of this audit report were completed prior to the largescale 
social distancing policies that have been implemented as a result of the 
novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Thus, this audit did not 
examine the impact of COVID-19 on the incentive programs administered 
by DOC. However, due to the enormous impact of COVID-19 on the 
economy, we asked DOC to provide information on how it plans to respond 
to COVID-19 as it relates to economic incentive programs. In response, 
DOC provided the following statement: 
 
We cannot speculate, but what we can say is that, 
given the unprecedented nature of this pandemic, 
there is no model for comparison to gauge the full 
effect of COVID-19. Our state like the rest of the 
nation and the world is facing historic unemployment 
and unprecedented economic collapse. We do not yet 
know the extent of the damage as we start the process 
of restarting our economy and getting South 
Carolinians back to work. That said, our team is 
committed to responding to the unique circumstances 
in a manner that will best enable the recovery of 
South Carolina businesses that have been impacted. 
And, while there are many unknowns in our current 
environment, SC Commerce has continued to make 
announcements and receive an increasing level of 
incoming projects. We are unwavering in our 
mission, while assuming additional responsibilities 
via our steering role as the lead agency in 
accelerateSC, to chart the path for South Carolina’s 
economic development recovery. 
 
DOC did not provide specific information related to the JDC and grant 
programs in its response. 
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We reviewed all projects approved for grant and job development credit 
(JDC) agreements from January 2009 through September 2019. We found:  
 
 972 total projects were approved, including 557 grants and 415 JDCs.  
 Grant awards totaled $526.2 million.  
 JDC approvals included up to nearly $6.2 billion in potentially 
reimbursable eligible costs with $223 million actually claimed.  
 Collectively, the approved projects were required to create 153,457 jobs. 
 
 
Overview of All JDC 
and Grant Recipients 
 
Of the 972 projects, the average value of incentives approved for each 
company is approximately $10 million, with a median value of $500,000. 
In the 10-year timeframe, two companies were approved for over 
$400 million each and three companies were approved for  
$300–$399 million each. Of the 676 unique companies receiving incentives, 
113 were approved for both a grant and JDC by the Coordinating Council. 
 
 
Overview of Revitalization 
Agreements 
 
From January 2009 through September 2019, the Coordinating Council 
executed 415 RVAs with JDC recipients. The 415 RVAs allow for up to 
nearly $6.2 billion potentially eligible costs to be claimed and require 
66,684 new jobs be created within the state by the recipient companies. 
As of September 30, 2019, 70.8% of RVAs executed in the 10-year 
timeframe were still active and the eligible JDC funds being claimed by the 
companies. According to a Coordinating Council official, most companies 
are not able to claim the maximum amount of JDC funds they are approved 
due to the method in which the JDCs are calculated.  
 
Of the 415 RVAs: 
 
 Spartanburg, Greenville, and Lancaster Counties each had 40 or more 
RVAs executed during the 10-year timeframe.  
 York County had the most required new jobs (9,300) of all the counties. 
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 Of the 46 South Carolina counties, 8 counties did not receive any JDC 






According to a Coordinating Council official, it is difficult to attract projects 
to rural counties. Map 1.4 provides information on the number of enterprise 
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Overview of Grant Awards  
The Coordinating Council awarded approximately $526 million in 
grant funds to 557 projects between January 2009 and September 2019. 
The companies awarded these grant funds are required to invest 
approximately $23 billion and create 86,773 new jobs. As of September 30, 
2019, 46.5% of the grants were fully expended and only 18.5% were still 
open and have available money to expend.  
 
As with the JDCs, Greenville and Spartanburg Counties were among the top 
three counties awarded the most projects, and York County had the second 
highest number of awarded projects. These three counties were also 
required to create the highest number of new jobs in the state, with 
York County required to create the highest number of new jobs (8,400). 
Spartanburg County was required to invest the most capital into the state 
(approximately $3.4 billion), and Anderson County had the second highest 
investment requirement (approximately $2.5 billion). Of the 46 South 
Carolina counties, only 1 county, McCormick, did not receive a grant for a 
new project in the 10-year timeframe. Map 1.5 provides information on the 
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Map 1.5: Number of Grant Projects Awarded by County 
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Overview of Top Ten 
Companies 
 
The top ten JDC recipient companies by eligible cost amounts include eight 
manufacturing companies, one marketing and technology firm, and one 
financial service company. The top 10 companies were awarded 52 separate 
projects totaling approximately $2.8 billion in eligible costs and required to 
create 15,096 new jobs. The 52 projects were located in 10 counties.  
 
The top ten grant recipient companies by grant amount were all 
manufacturing companies, six of which are the same manufacturing 
companies that were awarded the most JDCs. The top 10 companies 
receiving grants were awarded 18 separate projects totaling approximately 
$287 million, required to create 11,451 new jobs, and invest approximately 
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Chapter 2 
 
Effectiveness and Transparency of  
Incentive Programs 
 
 In this chapter, we discuss the effectiveness and transparency of the JDC 
and business development grant programs. Our goal was to identify the 
actual number of jobs and capital investment generated by companies that 
have received JDCs or grants. We were also asked to examine the 
transparency of the incentive programs. We found: 
 
 DOC does not continue to track additional job creation numbers for 
companies that receive JDCs once they have reached their required 
amount, so it is not possible to know the number of actual jobs created 
by companies that received JDCs. 
 Of the 121 closed JDC projects executed since September 1, 2009, only 
11 projects maximized their job development credits through job creation. 
 Of the 248 grants that have been closed since 2009, 31,298 of the required 
34,172 jobs were created by those companies. Of the $10 billion required 
total investment, the companies invested $11.8 billion.  
 DOC does not have sufficient performance measures to determine the 
overall effectiveness of the JDC or grant programs. 
 DOC does not publicize the number of jobs and amount of capital 
investment actually generated by the JDC and grant programs. 
 DOC does not examine the fiscal impact of the JDC or grant programs. 
 The Palmetto Partners program, which is administered by DOC and funds 
special marketing events through donations, does not have adequate 
performance measures. There are no internal guidelines at DOC regarding 
the avoidance of conflicts of interest between companies that donate to 






 Chapter 2 




 Page 14  LAC/19-1 Department of Commerce 
Actual Jobs 
Created by JDC 
and Grant Projects 
 
We reviewed the Customer Relations Management database that DOC uses 
to record incentive program information. The database contains information 
related to projects that have received grants and/or JDC awards; however, 
actual jobs created through the JDC program are not recorded in the 
database, if above the minimum required level. From the database, we 
examined information on 41 JDC revitalization agreements (RVA) that 
were executed in 2014 and 40 grant projects that were awarded in 2014. 
We chose to examine these projects in order to see how projects approved in 
the past have materialized. Additionally, we reviewed an analysis prepared 
by DOC for all JDC projects with executed RVAs during the audit period.  
 
We reviewed the actual jobs created for all JDC and grant projects awarded 
during the audit period and we found: 
 
 Actual job numbers created by all JDC projects are not recorded and/or 
tracked by DOC officials, if above the minimum required level. 
 The JDC projects approved in 2014, which were certified to claim the 
JDCs, created 81% of the total jobs required to be created by JDC 
recipients.  
 According to DOC’s analysis, 205 of 415 JDC projects have certified 
their RVAs, thus meeting their job creation goals.  
 Of the 40 grant projects reviewed from 2014, 25 projects have closed or 
are maintaining their required jobs, and have exceeded their job creation 
goals.  
 Grant projects that have closed or are maintaining the level of required 




Review of JDC Projects   
We reviewed the database system for all JDC projects that executed their 
RVAs in 2014, which totaled 41 projects. We chose to examine projects 
executed in 2014 because doing so would allow us to examine the long-term 
effectiveness of JDCs compared to more recently-executed projects.  
 
Of those 41 projects, 27 projects are certified, open, and active, and able to 
claim the JDCs for which they were approved. The remaining 14 projects 
were terminated from the program for not paying fees or not meeting their 
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The 27 projects that certified their RVAs were required to create 6,347 jobs. 
At the time we reviewed the sample, the projects had created 6,369 jobs. 
Therefore, the certified projects exceeded their goals. One project reached its 
job creation goals, but decided not to move forward in claiming the JDCs. 
Overall, all JDC projects that executed their RVAs in 2014 were required to 
create 8,050 jobs. The projects that certified and the project that voluntarily 
withdrew created 6,484 of the required jobs, 81% of the total required job 
creation.  
 
Table 2.1 shows the amount of jobs created by the sampled JDC projects. 
 
 
Table 2.1: Job Creation by 
Sampled JDC Projects, 












Certified  27  6,347  6,369  22 
Facility Closed  1  112  0  ‐112 
Terminated—Fees Not Paid  3  409  0  ‐409 
Terminated—Past Cutoff  6  825  60  ‐765 
Withdrawn  4  357  55*  ‐302 
TOTAL  41  8,050  6,484  ‐1,566 
 
*All 55 jobs were created by 1 company whose minimum job requirement was 55. 
 
Source: DOC and LAC Analysis 
 
In addition to the JDC projects approved in 2014, we reviewed an analysis 
conducted by DOC discussing all RVAs executed between September 1, 
2009 and September 30, 2019. A total of 415 RVAs were executed during 
this timeframe. The presence of confidential taxpayer information prevented 
us from verifying the accuracy of this information. 
 
Of the 415 RVAs, 174 projects have certified and are entitled to claim their 
eligible JDCs. As of September 30, 2019, these projects had collectively 
created 31,116 jobs. 
 
Of the 415 RVAs, 121 projects were closed for various reasons, as of 
September 30, 2019. Of these 121 projects, 11 projects closed after 
maxing out their eligible JDCs; these projects created 1,354 jobs. Four 
projects closed after timing out of the program; these four projects created 
851 jobs. Of the 121 closed projects, 16 projects closed after certifying 
but not continuing in the program; these 16 projects created 1,241 jobs. 
The remaining 90 closed projects never certified their RVAs.   
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Table 2.2 shows the number of jobs created by all certified JDCs projects, 
though, as noted below, these numbers are imprecise due to DOC’s method 
of counting jobs. 
 
 
Table 2.2: Jobs Created by 
Certified JDC Projects,  













Source: DOC and LAC Analysis 
 
 
The actual number of jobs created by these projects is unknown, because the 
actual jobs recorded for JDC projects are only maintained to the level they 
are required to create the jobs. If figures for certain projects exceed the 
required amount, that figure is not always entered into the database system. 
According to a DOC official, the actual number of jobs created by JDC 
projects does not matter for program administration because the companies 
can claim JDCs only to the level for which they were approved.  
 
However, it is important to the general public and policy makers to know 
the exact number of jobs that have been created with the aid of JDCs in 
order to gauge program effectiveness. Additionally, knowing how many jobs 
are created by JDCs approved in the past can assist DOC staff in projecting 
the number of jobs that might be created by future projects. Without 
complete information on the actual number of jobs created by JDC projects, 
DOC has no way to know the amount by which companies are exceeding 
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Review of Grant Projects 
 
 
We reviewed the database system for 40 grant projects that were approved 
in 2014. We chose to examine projects executed in 2014 because it would 
allow us to examine the long-term effectiveness of grants, compared to more 
recently-executed projects. 
 
Of the 40 projects approved, 5 projects are being assessed for their 
performance and job creation. In this status, the actual number of jobs 
created is not finalized. Seven projects are in repayment status because they 
did not meet their job creation goals. However, they created 415 out of 
995 jobs, or 42% of their collective goal. Of the 40 projects, 18 projects are 
closed or within their maintenance periods. These 18 projects have created 
127% of the required jobs, 4,186 jobs out of a collective goal of 3,300 jobs. 
The remaining 10 projects were still open and have time to meet their job 




Table 2.3: Jobs Created by 
Reviewed Grant Projects, 











Repayment  7  995  415  ‐580 
Closed/ 
In Maintenance 
18  3,300  4,186  886 
TOTAL  25*  4,295  4,601  306 
  
*This number does not include the 15 projects that still have time 
to complete their job creation requirement. 
 
Source: DOC and LAC Analysis 
 
We reviewed data on all projects that were awarded grants between 
January 2009 and September 2019. A total of 557 projects were reviewed. 
Of the total 557 projects, 309 projects are still open and are either working 
toward meeting their goals or are being reviewed to determine if they have 
met their goals. These projects are required to collectively create 52,099 
jobs.  
 
Table 2.4 shows the remaining 248 projects that are either closed, pending 
closeout, or maintaining their job creation numbers. These 248 projects are 
required to collectively create 34,172 jobs, of which 92% have been created 
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Table 2.4: Status of Closed and 
Maintenance Period Grants, 











Closed  187  24,539  21,415  ‐3,124 
Closeout Pending  17  2,047  890  ‐1,157 
Expended / 
PA in Maintenance* 
44  7,586  8,993  1,407 
TOTAL  248  34,172  31,298  ‐2,874 
 
* Expended means all grant funds have been distributed. Performance Agreement 
(PA) in Maintenance means the company is maintaining its job creation figures 
per the terms in the agreement. 
 
Source: DOC and LAC Analysis 
 
 
Review of Actual Job 
Data Entry 
 
We asked about the procedures for inputting job creation data into the 
database system. According to DOC officials, no written procedures are 
maintained to prescribe how the information should be entered or from what 
source of documentation. Having written procedures and consistent, reliable 
sources for the job creation data would allow for greater confidence in the 






1. The S.C. Department of Commerce should record actual job creation 
figures even in excess of the revitalization agreement minimum job 
requirements, for all job development credit projects.  
 
2. The S.C. Department of Commerce should develop procedures on 
how to enter job creation data and from what source the information 
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Actual Capital 
Investment  
Made by JDC and 
Grant Projects 
 
We reviewed capital investment data for all 557 grant awards during the 
audit period, data for all 415 JDCs, as well as a sample of grants and JDCs 
awarded in calendar year 2014. We found:  
 
 Complete capital investment made by all JDC projects is not recorded 
and/or tracked by the agency.  
 The certified JDC projects we reviewed exceeded the collective capital 
investment requirements of their RVAs.  
 According to DOC’s analysis of all executed RVAs, certified JDC 
projects met the collective capital investment required in their RVAs.   
 Grant projects that have closed, are pending closeout, or are in the 
maintenance period have collectively made higher capital investments 
than required in their performance agreements.  
 
We were not able to review data on all JDC projects for actual capital 
investment because DOC does not maintain that information in an 
accessible format. We reviewed 18 JDC files from DOC in order to examine 
actual capital investment information. However, the results of our JDC 
sample cannot be used to accurately determine the effectiveness of the JDC 
program as a whole. Additionally, we reviewed an analysis prepared by 
DOC for all JDC projects with executed RVAs during the audit period. 
 
 
Review of JDC Projects  
We requested information on the actual capital investments recorded for all 
approved JDC projects for the period of our review. However, a DOC 
official stated that the actual capital investment information for JDCs is 
maintained only to the level the companies are required to certify their 
RVAs. If figures for certain projects exceed the required amount, that figure 
is not always entered into the DOC database.  
 
According to a DOC official, the actual amount of capital investments made 
by JDC projects does not matter for program administration purposes 
because the companies can claim JDCs only up to the level for which they 
were approved. However, it is important to the general public and policy 
makers to know how much actual capital investment is made with the aid of 
JDCs in order to gauge the effectiveness of the program. Without 
information on the actual amount of capital investment made by JDC-aided 
projects, it is impossible to completely determine the effectiveness of the 
JDC program regarding its ability to attract capital investment. 
 
We reviewed 18 JDC files obtained from DOC. The 18 files were 
judgmentally selected based on factors such as geographic location and 
amount awarded. The RVAs were executed across the full audit period.  
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Of the 18 projects reviewed, 7 projects have certified and are able to claim 
the JDCs for which they were approved. Nine projects are still within their 
timeframe to certify their RVA. Two projects were removed from the 
program or voluntarily withdrew from the program.  
 
The seven projects that certified were required to collectively invest 
$220,579,428. According to the files reviewed, these seven projects 
collectively invested $230,778,434; therefore, the certified projects 
exceeded their goals. The nine projects reviewed that still have time to 
certify are required to invest a total of $136,508,300.  However, the two 
projects that were removed/withdrawn from the JDC program did not meet 
their capital investment requirements, which totaled $22,518,940, and 
neither project was able to certify or claim JDCs.  
 




Table 2.5: Capital Investment of 
Sampled JDC Projects,  









Certified  7  $220,579,428  $230,778,434 
Open  9     136,508,300  ‐ 
Removed/Withdrawn  2   22,518,940  ‐ 
TOTAL  18  $379,606,668  $230,778,434  
 
Source: DOC and LAC Analysis 
 
Although the results of the sample indicate the JDC projects are exceeding 
their goals, our judgmental sample cannot be extrapolated to the entire 
population of JDC projects.  
 
In addition to our sample of 18 files, we reviewed an analysis conducted 
by DOC discussing all RVAs executed between January 1, 2009 and 
October 24, 2019. A total of 415 RVAs were executed during this 
timeframe. The accuracy of this analysis could not be verified by 
LAC auditors due to the presence of confidential taxpayer information.  
 
Of the 415 RVAs, 174 projects have certified and are eligible to claim JDCs. 
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Of the 415 RVAs, 121 projects were closed for various reasons as of 
September 30, 2019. Of these 121 projects, 11 projects closed after 
maxing out their eligible JDCs; these projects collectively invested a 
minimum of approximately $45.9 million. Four projects closed after 
timing out of the program; these four projects collectively invested a 
minimum of approximately $92.5 million. Sixteen projects closed after 
certifying but did not continue in the program. These 16 projects 
collectively invested a minimum of approximately $182.6 million. 
The remaining 90 closed projects never certified their RVAs. The actual 
amount of investment made by these projects is unknown.  
 
Table 2.6 shows the amount of capital investment made by all certified 
JDC projects, up to the required investment amount.  
 
 
Table 2.6: Status of Certified JDC 
















Source: DOC and LAC Analysis 
 
 
Review of Grant Projects  
We reviewed data for all 557 projects that were awarded grants between 
January 2009 and September 2019. Of the 557 projects, 309 projects are still 
open and working toward meeting their goals, or are being reviewed to 
determine if they have met their goals. These in-progress grant projects are 
required to collectively invest approximately $13 billion. 
 
The remaining 248 projects are either closed, pending closeout, or 
maintaining their job creation numbers. These 248 projects were required to 
collectively invest approximately $10 billion. A total of approximately 
$11 billion has been invested by these projects, thus exceeding their goals. 
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Table 2.7: Capital Investment 
of All Grant Projects,  










248  $10,000,812,972  $11,811,292,679  $1,810,479,707 
Open / Assessing 
Performance 
309  13,542,165,368  154,510,647  (13,387,654,721) 
TOTAL  557  $23,542,978,340  $11,965,803,326  $(11,577,175,014)*
 
*  This difference can possibly be met or exceeded because companies still have time to create 
the capital investment. 
 






3. The S.C. Department of Commerce should record and publish the 
actual capital investments made for all job development credit projects, 
including any capital investment that exceeds the amount agreed upon 







We reviewed the availability of job creation and capital investment data to 
the public related to projects that were awarded economic incentives. 
We evaluated the annual reports issued by DOC and the Coordinating 
Council for the inclusion of actual job creation and capital investment data. 
The availability of job creation and capital investment data as a result of 
incentives by other Southeastern states was also reviewed. We found: 
 
 DOC and the Coordinating Council’s annual reports and press releases 
only include projected figures for job creation and capital investment.  
 Neither DOC nor the Coordinating Council publish actual job creation 
and capital investment data.  
 Neither DOC nor the Coordinating Council have performance measures 
that effectively measure the impact of its discretionary incentive 
programs. 
 The Coordinating Council does not require or record the wage levels for 
new jobs created from grant projects.  
 Other Southeastern states report useful data regarding their economic 
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Review of Performance 
Measures 
 
DOC and the Coordinating Council do not have sufficient performance 
measures regarding the effectiveness of the JDC and grant programs. 
According to a DOC official, the performance measures for the JDC and 
grant programs are the actual job numbers achieved and capital investment 
made compared to the original performance requirements for the incentives. 
However, as discussed below, these numbers are not publicized.  
 
Additionally, DOC and the Coordinating Council do not have benchmarks 
for determining whether the JDC and grant programs are, as a whole, 
successful. Although projected capital investment and job creation are  
important measures, overall information on the program is also necessary 
in order to determine the effectiveness of the grants and JDCs. Such 
information, which can be found in our analysis included in Actual Jobs 
Created by JDC and Grant Projects and Actual Capital Investment Made by 
JDC and Grant Projects, can include: 
 
 Long-term job projections versus actual job creation. 
 Long-term capital investment projections versus actual capital 
investment. 
 Percentage of projects that were not successful. 
 Information on recently closed projects. 
 
Currently, in order to determine whether a company has met its goals 
prescribed in the agreements, DOC utilizes the reports submitted by the 
companies, which include information on job creation, as well as property 
tax assessments or actual invoices for capital investment verification. 
The company reports are also used to enter the job creation and capital 
investment figures into the DOC database.   
 
For grant projects, the job creation and capital investment figures are 
verified once after the company claims to have met its goals. If a grant 
project has a maintenance period, the figures are verified each year of the 
maintenance period. The figures are verified by utilizing payroll and 
property assessment records submitted by each company.  
 
For JDC projects, the job creation and capital investment figures are verified 
when the company claims to have completed its requirements. After the 
companies have certified that they have met their requirements, they submit 
quarterly and annual reports to document maintenance of  jobs created until 
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In order for a company to claim JDCs on the new jobs created, those jobs 
must pay at or above the minimum wage requirement outlined in the signed 
RVA. Eligible jobs with wages below the minimum wage requirement may 
still be counted toward the minimum job creation requirement, even though 
the jobs are not themselves eligible for job development credits. In our 
review of project files, the Coordinating Council does not require companies 
to submit wage information for the new jobs created by the grant projects. 
Without knowing the wage levels these new jobs are paying, it is more 
difficult to assess the quality of employment these projects are bringing to 
the state with the use of public funds.   
 
 
Interested Parties  
In order to gain perspectives from outside of DOC regarding the 
effectiveness of incentive programs administered by DOC, we spoke with 
several officials outside of DOC who are involved in economic development 
activities that relate to incentives. These officials included representatives 
from companies that have received incentives, local economic development 
professionals, and site development consultants.  
 
The officials we talked to uniformly agreed that the incentives overseen by 
DOC are vital to attracting businesses to South Carolina and fostering the 
development of existing businesses. The officials mostly expressed 
satisfaction with the job DOC does in administering the incentives.  
 
Feedback from interested parties alone is not in itself sufficient evidence of 
the effectiveness of the incentive programs. As beneficiaries of the 
programs, the interested parties have a stake in the continuance of the 
incentive programs. However, feedback from interested parties is useful in 
helping to gauge the effectiveness of the incentives and satisfaction 
regarding DOC’s administration of the incentives, and the interested parties 
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Evaluation of the Annual 
Reports 
 
DOC and the Coordinating Council creates and issues annual reports to 
publicize how many projects were approved each year. DOC and the 
Coordinating Council issues annual reports for: 
 
 The S.C. Department of Commerce Annual Accountability Reports. 
 The Coordinating Council’s grant programs. 
 The Coordinating Council’s Enterprise Zone Activity, including the 
Job Development Credit (JDC) program.    
 
Included in the Coordinating Council’s grant program annual reports are the 
number of jobs projected to be created or retained and how much capital 
investment the company is projected to make in the state. The Enterprise 
Zone reports also include information on projected job creation and 
minimum capital investment in the state, but additionally discuss projected 
net economic benefit from the JDC projects.  
 
In each annual report, DOC and the Coordinating Council compare the 
number of projects approved over the most recent three years. The annual 
reports relating to grants provide a breakdown of how much money is 
coming from each of three grant funds. A DOC official explained that 
JDC funds are rebates from the employee withholding taxes.  
 
While the reports may show projected jobs, investment, or economic 
benefit, the reports do not show any actual figures related to the projects’ 
performances. In addition to the lack of performance data, the reports do not 
include the number of approved projects that were not successful in job 
creation efforts. 
 
Additionally, the reports do not contain performance measures. Performance 
measures regarding the JDC and grant programs are necessary in order for 
DOC and the Coordinating Council to have benchmarks with which to 
measure the success of those programs. Such performance measures could 
incorporate some of the analysis described in Actual Jobs Created by JDC 
and Grant Projects and Actual Capital Investment Made by JDC and Grant 
Projects, which shows the number of jobs created and capital investment 
made by the JDC and grant programs, compared to the number of jobs 
originally required in the grant agreement. In addition to the number of jobs 
created by these projects, including the median wage level for the new jobs 
in the annual reports would allow the General Assembly and the general 
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Transparency to  




Since public funds are utilized to provide grants and JDCs to companies, 
it is important for the general public and policy makers to know whether 
those funds are being used effectively. Without transparent disclosure of 
how these projects are performing, the general public and policy makers are 
unable to determine if the incentives awarded to companies are successful.  
 
In addition to the actual figures for jobs created and capital investment, the 
status and compliance of projects are important as well. For example, if a 
company received an incentive and closed, executed a mass layoff, or filed 
for bankruptcy, the public should know if enforcement efforts are being 






We found that other Southeastern states’ economic development agencies 
provide current details on awards and incentivized projects, such as the 
number of new jobs created, on their websites. For example; 
 
 North Carolina publishes information related to the actual jobs created 
and retained, as well as the reported average wage for  each company. 
North Carolina also publishes a report detailing the amount of funds 
recovered through clawbacks. 
 Tennessee has a searchable, online database that allows the public to see 
the number of jobs created by each company receiving an incentive from 
the state. 
 Virginia has an interactive website that provides transparent data related 
to incented project performance. Additionally, according to Virginia 
Code, three years of historical performance data is required in its reports. 
 
See Appendices C, D, E, and F for excerpts of information publicized by 
neighboring states. 
 
Publicizing incentives awarded would allow the General Assembly and the 
general public to see the advantages and disadvantages of providing 
economic incentives. The General Assembly would be better informed for 
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4. The S.C. Department of Commerce and the S.C. Coordinating Council 
for Economic Development should develop and publicize performance 
measures for the grant and job development credit programs, including 
measures for the overall effectiveness of the programs. 
 
5.   The S.C. Department of Commerce and the S.C. Coordinating Council 
for Economic Development should require grant projects to report the 
wage levels of the new jobs created from the project.  
 
6. The S.C. Department of Commerce and the S.C. Coordinating Council 
for Economic Development should report actual figures in its annual 
reports, as well as comparisons of those figures with  the projected jobs 
and capital investments reported at the beginning of each project. 
 
7.    The S.C. Department of Commerce and the S.C. Coordinating Council 
for Economic Development should report instances where projects were 
approved for incentives, but were canceled either due to the company 
withdrawing or failing to meet the requirements of the incentives 
 
 8.   The S.C. Department of Commerce and the S.C. Coordinating Council 
for Economic Development should report the median wage levels for all 
new jobs created by both job development credit and grant projects.  
 
9. The S.C. Department of Commerce and the S.C. Coordinating Council 
for Economic Development should report the status of projects that 
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We examined whether DOC conducts fiscal impact analyses regarding 
grants and JDCs. In addition, we reviewed the Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board (GASB) standards related to the disclosure of tax 
abatement programs. We found: 
 
 DOC does not conduct fiscal impact analyses aside from the initial 
cost-benefit analysis. 
 DOC does not look back on projects and their fiscal impacts.  
 Statement No. 77 of GASB requires the disclosure of forgone tax 
revenues by tax abatement programs. However, it is questionable as to 
whether this statement applies to the JDC program.  
 
 
Review of Fiscal Impact 
Analyses 
 
According to a DOC official, fiscal impact analyses are not conducted on 
grant and/or JDC projects. Additionally, DOC does not perform any sort of 
“look back” analysis at the cost-benefit analysis performed prior to an award 
to determine if the project was successful and actually created the projected 
jobs and investment stated in the news releases.  
 
A fiscal impact analysis would examine the effect of incentives on 
government revenues and spending. Fiscal impact analyses can include: 
 
 The amount of revenue foregone due to companies’ receiving tax credits. 
 The amount of spending on grant projects. 
 The cost of infrastructure associated with new economic developments. 
 The cost of services associated with population growth resulting from 
new employment opportunities.  
 
According to DOC, there is no reasonable way to assess the actual fiscal 
impact of the projects on the state or locality. However, in March 2009, 
DOC’s division of research released a publication, Impact of Economic 
Development: A Community’s Guide to Understanding the Impact of a 
Newly Located Business, explaining the methodology and modeling tools 
for conducting a fiscal impact analysis. The research publication also stated 
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Connecticut’s Department of Economic and Community Development 
performs fiscal impact analyses on several of the tax programs and utilizes 
the REMI Tax-PI model software to estimate whether the revenue generated 
by the program exceeds the expenses. Connecticut worked with REMI 
developers to structure the model to fit the specific type of analysis it was 
seeking to conduct.  
 
We also examined whether Statement No. 77 of GASB is applicable to the 
JDC program. Statement No. 77 of GASB discusses the disclosure of tax 
abatements by state and local governments. The objective of the statement is 
to provide financial statement users with essential information relating to the 
reduction in tax revenues as a result of tax abatement programs.  
 
Several counties in South Carolina have included GASB tax abatement 
information in their comprehensive annual financial reports. However, after 
review of GASB Statement No. 77’s applicability to performance-based 
tax incentive programs such as the JDC program, it appears GASB 
Statement No. 77 may not apply to those particular kinds of programs.  
 
DOC states that GASB Statement No. 77 does not apply to the JDC program 
because it interprets GASB Statement No. 77 as applying only to tax 
abatements received prior to performance under incentive agreements. 
Since JDCs can only be claimed after the performance of the RVA 
stipulations, DOC concludes that GASB Statement No. 77 is not applicable 
to JDCs.  
 
Although GASB Statement No. 77 may not apply to the JDC program, 
credits claimed by companies participating in the JDC program have a 
fiscal impact on tax revenues. Reporting the credits claimed by companies 
participating in the JDC program would provide policy makers and the 
general public with relevant information about the fiscal impact of the 






10. The S.C. Department of Commerce should conduct a “look back” 
analysis of the fiscal impact of projects approved for grants and 
job development credits.  
 
11. The S.C. Department of Commerce should report forgone tax revenue 
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We examined the Palmetto Partners program, which is a program that is 
managed by DOC for the purpose of assisting in special marketing events 
and initiatives in order to bring jobs and investment to South Carolina. 
We found: 
 
 Palmetto Partners does not have adequate performance measures 
in place with which to measure its effectiveness in attracting jobs 
and capital investment.  
 DOC has guidelines for the spending of Palmetto Partners funds. 
Based on an examination of documentation of Palmetto Partners 
spending, those guidelines appear to have been followed. 
 DOC does not have guidelines relating to the interaction of the 
Coordinating Council for Economic Development and companies that 
have contributed to the Palmetto Partners program.  
 
 




The Palmetto Partners program was established in 1991 by the State Budget 
and Control Board as the Special Events Account. Its purpose is to raise and 
expend private funds for special marketing events to attract jobs and to 
make investments in South Carolina. The 1993 restructuring of state 
government moved the Special Events Account into DOC. The Special 
Events Account was renamed the Crescent Fund in 2005 and was renamed 
Palmetto Partners in 2011.  
 
Palmetto Partners funds are used to make disbursements that are normally 
not allowed, or limited, pursuant to state laws and regulations. These 
disbursements include the purchase of alcohol, meals, and entertainment for 
members of the business community. Funds are used for activities such as 
travel and costs for attending economic development conferences, and 
groundbreaking ceremonies. Table 2.8 shows Palmetto Partners’ financial 
position for calendar years 2018 and 2017 and Table 2.9 summarizes 
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Table 2.8: Palmetto Partners 
Financial Position,  














Table 2.9: Palmetto Partners 
Program Spending Areas, 























* Lead generation involves firms that receive funds in order to seek out companies willing to 
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DOC implemented an updated departmental policy regarding the use of 
Palmetto Partners funds in 2013. Palmetto Partners funds are required to be 
spent on the categories listed in Table 2.10. 
 
 































The DOC guidelines prohibit the use of Palmetto Partners funds for 
operating expenses or capital expenditures. DOC’s guidelines require 
documentation for all Palmetto Partners expenditures. Additionally, the 
guidelines require that the expenses be approved by any two of the 
following DOC officials: 
 
 Secretary of Commerce. 
 Legal counsel. 
 Chief of staff. 
 Chief financial officer. 
 Controller. 
 
The guidelines state that spouse travel and meal expenses are generally not 
allowable unless specific justification is provided and approved in advance 
by the Secretary of Commerce. We examined documentation for all 
Palmetto Partners expenditures for the last six months of calendar year 
2019. Based on our examination, DOC followed its guidelines for spending 
the Palmetto Partners funds.  
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Lack of Performance 
Measures 
 
The Palmetto Partners program does not have performance measures 
specific to the activities funded by the program. According to a DOC 
official, Palmetto Partners uses the same performance measures as the DOC, 
which are in the annual accountability report. However, the accountability 
report does not have any specific discussion of the performance of Palmetto 
Partners. Without performance measures, it is impossible for policy makers 
and the general public to know whether these funds administered by DOC 
are effectively attracting jobs and investment to South Carolina. 
 
Potential performance measures for Palmetto Partners projects could be 
based on the category area of the spending. Examples of such potential 
performance measures, by category, are listed in Table 2.11. 
 
 
Table 2.11: Potential Performance 
Measures for Palmetto Partners 















Palmetto Partners currently gathers information that could be published as a 
performance measure. For example, for business matchmaking summits, 
DOC conducts surveys that provide valuable information regarding the 
effectiveness of those events. Those surveys capture, among other things: 
 
 Contracts in progress as a result of the event. 
 Establishment of new relationships. 
 Satisfaction feedback.  
 
Such information could be cumulated and published as part of a 
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Relationship with the 
Coordinating Council for 
Economic Development 
 
Several companies that have received incentives authorized by the 
Coordinating Council donated to the Palmetto Partners program. 
We discussed this issue with DOC officials to determine whether a 
conflict of interest exists.  
 
According to DOC officials, the Coordinating Council and Palmetto 
Partners program do not interact. A Coordinating Council official stated that 
they do not take into account whether a company has contributed to 
Palmetto Partners when determining whether to recommend them for 
incentives. However, DOC stated that a lawyer attempted to use the 
lawyer’s law firm’s status as a Palmetto Partner to negotiate more incentives 
for a client. DOC states that the law firm’s status as a Palmetto Partner had 
no effect on the negotiation, and there was no evidence that the client 
company sought preferential treatment through its counsel.  
 
DOC does not have guidelines regarding the interaction of the Coordinating 
Council with companies that have contributed to the Palmetto Partners 
program. Such guidelines could be used to minimize potential conflicts of 
interest. Examples of such guidelines could include: 
 
 Prohibition of companies from leveraging their contributions to 
Palmetto Partners in their applications for JDCs or grants. 
 Affidavits stating that any potential contributions to Palmetto Partners 
were not a factor in the incentive decision-making process. 
 Protocols regarding interactions between contributing companies and the 
Coordinating Council. 
 
We did not find evidence that any decision of the Coordinating Council was 
influenced by knowledge that a company potentially receiving incentives 
donated to the Palmetto Partners program. However, guidelines specifying 
the relationship between Palmetto Partners and Coordinating Council could 
minimize the appearance of a conflict of interest and ensure a fair 






12. The S.C. Department of Commerce should develop performance 
measures for activities funded by the Palmetto Partners program. 
 
13. The S.C. Department of Commerce should adopt guidelines relating to 
the interaction of the Coordinating Council for Economic Development 
and companies that have contributed to the Palmetto Partners program. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Oversight of Incentive Programs 
 
 We reviewed county oversight of grant funds, examined a selection of files 
for documentation regarding DOC oversight, and examined the 
S.C. Department of Revenue’s (DOR) auditing of the JDC program, 
and found: 
 
 Counties do not submit quarterly status reports regarding the 
compliance of grant recipients with the grant agreement, as required. 
 Information companies submit to prove that they have created the 
requisite number of jobs to qualify for grants is insufficient to verify 
whether those jobs were actually created. 
 For projects that received grant funds, but did not create the requisite 
number of jobs and/or capital investment, DOC has been repaid 
$7,825,362 of $9,263,522 sought. 
 DOR reports that its auditors have completed 15 to 29 audits per year 
over the past three calendar years, but a range of 138 to 184 companies 
claimed JDCs over the past four years. 
 
 
Grant Compliance  Of the 557 grants that were awarded by the Coordinating Council and 
had signed performance agreements from January 2009 through 
September 2019, we reviewed 13 to determine if DOC is effectively 
tracking grant recipient compliance with grant award agreements and 
performance agreements. The grant projects reviewed were judgmentally 
selected based upon the following criteria: 
 
 Year of approval. 
 Amount of grant funds awarded. 
 Location of grant project. 
 Current status of the grant project (i.e., open or closed). 
 Outcome of grant project (i.e., successful completion of requirements 
or not). 
 
We specifically chose some projects that were unsuccessful due to interest 
from audit requestors and because such projects could highlight processes 
that need improvement. While this sample is not statistically valid and 
results may not represent the entire population, the findings obtained from 
this sample coupled with feedback from DOC highlight areas in need of 
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 We found that counties are not: 
 
 Submitting quarterly status reports as required. 
 Submitting required audit reports after a project’s completion. 
 
We found that companies did not always: 
 
 Begin a project within the required three-month timeframe. 
 Use grant funds within the required 18-month timeframe. 




County Compliance  
By state law, counties are technically the recipients of all grant funds 
approved by the Coordinating Council. When grants are awarded, the 
Coordinating Council and the county enter into an agreement that sets 
requirements for counties that are intended to help the grant program run 
more effectively and ensure the grant funds are being used for their 
intended purposes.  
 
The following are the areas for which we found non-compliance. 
 
Grant Award Agreement Requirement #1 
REQUIREMENT  
Counties must submit quarterly progress reports that provide a status 
update and identification of any material issues affecting a grant project. 
 
WHAT WE FOUND 
Only 3 of the 13 sampled projects had submitted all of the required 
quarterly reports. One project was the most recently-approved project in 
our sample and only had two required quarterly reports. Another project 
only had one required quarterly report. The final project submitted all 
four of its required quarterly reports. 
 
IMPORTANCE OF THIS REQUIREMENT 
These reports are used by the Coordinating Council for informational 
purposes. However, it is important that the counties keep the 
Coordinating Council up-to-date on the status of projects receiving 
grants. If the Coordinating Council knows that projects are not 
proceeding at the pace that they should, they could relay that information 
to DOC staff or county officials. Additionally, it would allow DOC staff 
to more effectively help the project with obtaining permits, provide help 
with workforce training, etc. 
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Grant Award Agreement Requirement #2 
REQUIREMENT 
The county must certify, to the best of its knowledge, that the work of 
the project for which reimbursement is requested has been completed 
in accordance with the terms of the grant award agreement. 
 
WHAT WE FOUND 
We found certifications for payment and supporting backup 
documentation in DOC’s files for each project that received grant funds.  
 
IMPORTANCE OF THIS REQUIREMENT 
Having the counties conduct their own review of the use of grant funds 
by companies for a project provides an extra layer of assurance that the 
funds are being used for their intended purpose. 
 
Grant Award Agreement Requirement #3 
REQUIREMENT 
Counties must submit a copy of an audit report that includes an 
examination and accounting of the expenditures of grant funds following 
the completion of a project to the Coordinating Council. The audit shall 
be prepared using generally accepted auditing standards established by 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants or Government 
Accountability Office Yellow Book standards. 
 
WHAT WE FOUND 
Of the 13 projects in our sample, 12 were completed projects. No audit 
was found in any of the completed projects’ files. In addition, when 
asked about the audit requirement, a Coordinating Council official 
informed us that they could not remember an audit report ever being 
provided by a county to the Coordinating Council. 
 
IMPORTANCE OF THIS REQUIREMENT 
An audit of a county’s handling of grant funds provides assurance that 
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Company Compliance  
Whenever grants are awarded to a project that is locating or expanding in 
South Carolina, the Coordinating Council enters into a performance 
agreement with the company undertaking the project and the county in 
which the project is locating. Performance agreements specify the 
requirements companies must follow throughout the course of a project. 
 
Performance Agreement Requirement #1 
REQUIREMENT 
Companies must begin a project within three months of the effective date 
of the performance agreement. 
 
WHAT WE FOUND 
Of the ten performance agreements with this requirement, we found 
evidence that all but one project started within the required timeframe. 
The project lacked documentation to show that it started within 
three months; however, there was documentation to show that it started 
shortly thereafter. 
 
Performance Agreement Requirement #2 
REQUIREMENT 
Companies must complete the portion of the project to be funded in 
whole or in part with grant funds within 18 months of the effective date 
of the performance agreement. 
 
WHAT WE FOUND 
Of the ten performance agreements with this requirement, we found that 
all but three of the projects expended the grant funds within the required 
timeframe. One of the projects that did not use the grant funds within the 
required timeframe relocated and eventually closed before all grant funds 
were disbursed. A lack of documentation for another company confirmed 
that the company did not use its grant funds. A problem obtaining 
stormwater permits prevented this project from starting within the 
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Performance Agreement Requirement #3 
REQUIREMENT 
Companies agree to make and maintain a capital investment of not less 
than a certain amount at the project site for specified purposes 
(e.g. land, building construction, etc.) within the grant period, which is 
typically three to five years. 
 
WHAT WE FOUND 
All 13 projects had this requirement in the performance agreement. 
We were able to verify that four of the projects met the investment 
requirement, time still remains for five of the projects to meet the 
requirement, and four of the projects did not meet the requirement. 
Two of the four declared bankruptcy, one relocated and later dissolved, 
and the other was acquired by another company. 
 
Performance Agreement Requirement #4 
REQUIREMENT 
Companies agree to create and maintain no fewer than a certain number 
of new, full-time jobs at the project site within the grant period, typically 
three to five years. 
 
WHAT WE FOUND 
All 13 projects had this requirement in the performance agreement. 
We found documentation to show that three companies met the 
requirement, but one of the companies used temporary workers to meet 
the requirement. Four companies did not meet the requirement—two due 
to bankruptcy, one due to an acquisition, and another due to 
relocation/closure of the project. Time still remains for five of the 
projects to meet the requirement. 
 
Performance Agreement Requirement #5 
REQUIREMENT  
Once the company has satisfied the job and investment requirements 
within the grant period, the company agrees to maintain the job and 
investment requirements at the project for a period of time, typically 
three to five years. 
 
WHAT WE FOUND 
Seven of the performance agreements in our sample had this 
requirement, but none of the projects had completed the first full year 
of their maintenance periods, so the projects do not have to report 
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Performance Agreement Requirement #6 
REQUIREMENT 
During the grant period, the company shall provide the Coordinating 
Council an annual written report that provides (1) the total number of 
new jobs filled and maintained by the company as of such date, and 
(2) the monthly average of total investment of the company at the 
project site during such year. 
 
WHAT WE FOUND 
Of the five projects with this requirement, only one project had 
submitted all of the required annual reports. The one project that met 




Compliance Tracking  
Since annual reports and quarterly reports were not submitted as required for 
the vast majority of projects in our sample, the Coordinating Council would 
not know, until the end of a project’s grant period, whether the project 
would meet either the jobs or investment requirements. This is unless the 
company undertaking the project or a DOC staff member would proactively 
contact the other party. 
 
A DOC staff member informed us that the staff is small and are not able to 
ensure that all of the required status reports are submitted. Both performance 
agreements and grant award agreements contain clauses that allow the 
Coordinating Council to refrain from extending any further assistance or 
grant funds if the county or company fails to abide by the conditions of the 
agreements. While these measures may only be appropriate for severe cases 
of non-compliance, the DOC staff could take a more proactive approach to 
ensure that counties and companies submit all of the project status reports as 
required. This can include developing a system that automatically notifies 
counties and companies when status reports are due and staff follow-up 
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Verifying Jobs 
We found that the only evidence DOC uses to verify companies’ job 
creation/retention is documentation provided by the company, itself. 
We also found that companies submitted different, non-uniform forms of 
documentation to verify that they had created and/or retained the number of 
jobs that were agreed to in the performance agreement. Some projects 
simply submitted what appeared to be a Microsoft® Office Excel 
spreadsheet with a list of employee names and variations of the following 
information: employee ID numbers, last four digits of social security 
numbers, dates of hire, wage amounts, and job titles. 
 
Employee lists that only provide an employee’s last name, first initial, last 
four digits of the social security number, and date of hire, as submitted by 
one company and shown in Appendix G, are insufficient evidence of jobs 
created for the project. Additional verification should be conducted to 
confirm that the company employs the number of individuals that it claims 
are new, full-time employees.  
 
One way to verify a company’s job claims is to use quarterly employee data 
that is submitted by companies to the S.C. Department of Employment and 
Workforce (DEW). The quarterly wage contribution reports provide an 
employee’s full name, social security number, total wages, and hours 
worked. A DOC staff member told us that the Coordinating Council used to 
receive these reports, but have not received the reports since the mid-1990s. 
 
A data sharing agreement with DEW could allow for the efficient sharing of 
data that would allow for greater certainty regarding a company’s job claims 
information. While the information provided to DEW is self-reported by an 
employer, DOC staff could use the reports to verify whether the company is 
providing the same information to DEW that it is providing to DOC. 
 
In addition, the Coordinating Council could partner with the S.C. 
Department of Revenue (DOR) to use information that employers submit on 
their employees to verify new, full-time jobs or jobs retained. The 
Coordinating Council and DOR already share some information for the job 
development credit program. It is important to note that the head of DEW 
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Verifying Investment 
Most of the performance agreements require the grant funds be used on real 
property improvements (e.g. improvements to roads or a building). 
Therefore, a DOC staff member stated that they usually use a company’s 
property tax return to verify whether the company met the minimum 
investment requirement or not. When a company does not submit a property 
tax return to verify investment, it submits invoices and proofs of payment, 
usually in the form of copies of checks or bank statements, to verify that the 
investment was made. 
 
Site Visits 
In addition to the submission of invoices/proofs of payment and/or property 
tax returns, DOC staff started conducting site visits at a grant recipient’s 
project location to verify that grant funds were used on the things that were 
agreed upon between the parties. According to a DOC official, the first site 
visit was conducted in 2014 in response to a company that fraudulently 
claimed expenditures for grant funds that it did not actually make. 
 
From September 2014 to February 24, 2020, DOC staff conducted 53 site 
visits with 21 of the visits conducted since the start of our audit in August 
2019. Prior to the start of our audit, DOC staff had not conducted a site visit 
since September 2018. DOC claims site visits have been conducted 
sporadically in the past due to a lack of dedicated, full-time staff to ensure 
the visits are performed. 
 
During site visits, a DOC employee meets with a company official to 
discuss what the project’s eligible expenditures were and is then physically 
shown what the grant funds were used to purchase. The DOC employee 
documents the improvements with pictures that are submitted with the rest 
of the findings to Coordinating Council. 
 
Currently, DOC plans to conduct site visits for companies that receive grant 
funds for building upfits (i.e., modifications) because that is where fraud 
occurred in the past and where DOC staff believe fraud risk is the greatest. 
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Recommendations  14. The Coordinating Council for Economic Development should take a 
more proactive approach to ensure that companies and counties submit 
all of the project status reports as required. 
 
15. The Coordinating Council for Economic Development should continue 
conducting site visits at all grant projects where fraud risk is the 
greatest.   
 
16. The Coordinating Council for Economic Development should conduct 
additional verification of the new or retained jobs that a grant recipient 
claims. 
 
17. The Coordinating Council for Economic Development should seek a 
data sharing agreement that would allow it to use data from the 
S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce and/or the 
S.C. Department of Revenue to verify that a grant recipient created the 
new, full-time jobs, or retained jobs that it claimed to have created. 
 
 
Grant Repayments  When companies fail to satisfy and maintain job and/or investment 
requirements as set forth in performance agreements, the Coordinating 
Council may “claw back” (i.e., require repayment of) grant funds. The 
Coordinating Council may also claw back grant funds when a company 
defaults on its performance agreement. Events of default include a company 
providing false or misleading information and a company voluntarily filing 
a petition for bankruptcy. Furthermore, companies who did not meet the 
investment and/or jobs requirements can be given additional time to invest 




How Grant Clawbacks are 
Calculated 
 
Performance agreements require repayment of all grant funds if a company: 
 
 Does not locate in South Carolina. 
 Fails to create any new jobs and make any investment in South Carolina. 
 
A company is required to repay a portion of the grant funds expended if it: 
 
 Creates jobs and/or makes investment but fails to meet the job 
requirement and/or the investment requirement. 
 Meets, but then fails to maintain, either requirement (if the company has 
a contractual maintenance requirement).  
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The portion of grant funds that is required to be repaid is based upon the 
actual number of jobs created and/or investment made. In addition, a pro 
rata repayment for failure to meet either the job requirement or the 
investment requirement will be calculated, independently, with each 
calculation based on 50% of the grant funds expended. 
 
For example, if a company receives a $100,000 grant and, at the end of its 
performance period, only creates 80% of the required jobs and makes 90% 
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The scope of our audit included all 557 grants that were approved by the 
Coordinating Council and had signed performance agreements from 
January 1, 2009 through September 30, 2019. Of the 557 grants, 248 have 
been evaluated by DOC staff for performance compliance. The remaining 
309 either have not reached the end of their performance periods or are still 
being evaluated. Of the 248 grants that have been evaluated: 
 
 156 met or exceeded both the jobs and investment requirements. 
 47 met or exceeded one of the requirements, but failed to meet the other 
requirement. 
 45 failed to meet either requirement. This number includes 18 projects 
that did not provide documentation and were assumed to fail to meet 
both requirements. 
 
Table 3.2 shows an overview of the 248 grants and includes the actual 




Table 3.2: Total Grants That Have Been Evaluated for Performance, 















Met or Exceeded Both   156  $132,933,903  $7,849,716,104  $9,431,832,993  21,515  25,361 
Met or Exceeded Only One  47  24,630,000  1,000,534,414  1,741,439,368  6,318  4,809 
Failed to Meet Both   45  20,068,057  1,150,562,454  638,020,318  6,339  1,128 
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Calculation of Grant 
Clawbacks 
 
Using data provided by the Coordinating Council, we calculated the amount 
of clawbacks that could have been issued based upon the clawback 
calculation in the performance agreements. We found that, of the projects in 
our scope that failed to meet the jobs requirement and/or the investment 
requirement, the Coordinating Council could have issued approximately 
$17 million in clawbacks. However, there is a clause in performance 
agreements that allows the Coordinating Council to amend performance 
agreements if the company fails to meet either requirement. The clause 
states: 
 
If (a) the Investment Requirement is not met or (b) 
the total number of full time jobs created is less than 
the Job Requirement or (c) the investment is not 
made or the jobs are not created within the Grant 
Period, the Company may provide detailed 
documentation that a good faith effort was made to 
achieve both the Job Requirement and the Investment  
Requirement. To the extent that extenuating 
circumstances prevent the Company from fulfilling 
its commitments contained herein, and the Grantee 
and the Council, in their sole discretion, acknowledge 
such circumstances in writing, this Agreement may 
be modified in writing by mutual agreement of the 
parties. 
 
In essence, the clause allows the Coordinating Council flexibility to reduce 
or waive any repayment that would otherwise be required for a company 
that fails to meet either performance requirement. A DOC staff member 
provided examples of circumstances that would justify a waiver or reduction 
of the repayment required: 
 
 Job requirements are often harder to fill in a rural county due to high 
attrition and lack of qualified workers. 
 South Carolina’s low unemployment rate makes it difficult for some 
companies to fill openings.  
 Some companies experience delays in construction, which causes delays 
in the timing of the project. 
 Downturns in the economy change business plans for some companies. 
For example, the staff member noted that recent tariffs have increased 
costs of supplies for some companies and have required them to scale 
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Due to the Coordinating Council’s ability to waive or reduce repayment 
amounts, of the $16,961,041 for which the Coordinating Council could 
have issued clawbacks, it has only issued clawback letters for $9,263,522. 
As of February 21, 2020, it has received $7,825,362. There is still a balance 
of $1,438,160 owed, and a DOC staff member said that the Coordinating 
Council will use its best efforts to collect this amount. 
 
Other Grant Repayments 
In addition to the clawbacks mentioned above, some companies who have 
not met their investment or job requirements are allowed additional time by 
the Coordinating Council to create jobs or investment but are required to 
make an initial/partial repayment of grant funds. As of February 21, 2020, 
four projects fell into this category and had made initial/partial repayments 
totaling $300,000. 
 
The Coordinating Council also received grant repayments from companies 
that had failed to maintain the minimum job requirement for a period of 
time. As of February 21, 2020, two projects fell into this category and had 
made repayments totaling $125,000. 
 
Chart 3.3 provides an overview on the status of the 248 closed grants and 
4 grants with partial repayments in our review as of February 21, 2020. 
 
 
Chart 3.3: Overview of the 248  
Grants Evaluated for Performance 
and 4 Grants with Partial 
Repayments,  
January 2009 – September 2019 
 
 
Note: These amounts are based on grant funds drawn rather than grant funds awarded. 
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Problems Collecting All 
Clawback Funds 
 
Included in the 45 grants that failed to meet the job and investment 
requirements are 20 grants for which the Coordinating Council required 
repayment, but has written off, or is pending write-off, as uncollectable. 
Seventeen of the grants are complete write-offs, and the Coordinating 
Council received partial payment for the remaining three projects. The 
reasons why these grants are mostly uncollectable vary greatly, but provide 
an insight on the challenges that the Coordinating Council has faced in 




This company was awarded $1,100,000 by the Coordinating Council in 
2010, of which $880,776 was actually dispersed. In 2011, the 
Coordinating Council learned that some of the work that had been 
reimbursed had not been done. In September of that same year, the 
Coordinating Council submitted a request to the S.C. Attorney General’s 
Office to refer the matter to the S.C. Law Enforcement Division to 
substantiate a claim of fraud. The Coordinating Council talked to the 
lawyer for the company and demanded $306,000 in repayment or be 
prosecuted for criminal fraud. The Coordinating Council was repaid 
$229,000, and the company still owes $77,000 as of February 13, 2020. 
Also, the project never located in South Carolina, so no investment was 
made and no jobs were created. 
 
COMPANY B 
This company was awarded $1,000,000 by the Coordinating Council in 
2009, and all of the grant funds were dispersed to the company. 
According to the Coordinating Council, the company has had minimal 
investment and job creation. The company claims that it is still in 
South Carolina and in business, although there is little sign of work done. 
Several people involved with the project have now been convicted of 
fraud. The company claims that it has created 80 jobs but has not provided 
documentation to verify investment amounts to the Coordinating Council. 
The Coordinating Council required the company to repay $847,328 of the 
grant funds, but has not received any of it. After talking with the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, DOC staff do not believe that the repayment is 
worth pursuing and the Coordinating Council has written off the $847,328 
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COMPANY C 
This company was awarded $1,200,000 by the Coordinating Council in 
2012, and all of the grant funds were dispersed to the company. The 
company never met its job or investment requirements. In 2017, the chief 
executive officer (CEO) of the company was sentenced to 15 years in 
prison in connection with two separate fraud schemes: $1.2 million that 
was fraudulently obtained from the Coordinating Council and a separate 
$30 million Ponzi scheme. The $1.2 million was fraudulently obtained 
from the Coordinating Council using a fraudulent “audited” financial 
report. The company also provided fraudulent contractor invoices and 
fraudulent bank statements in order to obtain the grant funds. Some of the 
grant funds were used for the CEO’s personal living expenses, including a 
Palm Beach wedding and a luxury SUV. 
 
Of the remaining 17 projects, 5 either filed bankruptcy or were insolvent, 
and the others ceased operations for various reasons (e.g. one partner pulled 
out of a joint venture). 
 
Bankruptcy 
Grant recipients filing for bankruptcy presents obvious challenges to the 
Coordinating Council when seeking repayment. As an unsecured creditor, 
the Coordinating Council receives repayment only after all of the secured 
creditors, such as banks, are paid. According to DOC staff, 6 of the 557 
grant recipients in our audit scope have filed for bankruptcy. The 
Coordinating Council has received repayment from two of the grant 
recipients that filed for bankruptcy. For the first recipient, the repayment 
amount was $9,614 of a $25,000 grant. For the second recipient, the 
repayment amount was $3,247.69 of a $250,000 grant. 
 
Fraud 
Three grant recipients are known to have committed fraud against the 
Coordinating Council within the period under review. In each case, the 
companies were reimbursed for expenditures that did not actually occur, 
but, in the case of Company C, the Coordinating Council did obtain 
photographic evidence that grant funds were expended for significant 
improvements within the scope of the grant (i.e., a new roof and HVAC 
system). A total of $3,080,776 was disbursed to the three companies. The 
Coordinating Council sought repayment of $2,928,104 of the disbursed 
funds, but has only able to obtain a $229,000 repayment from one of the 
projects.  
 
The best way to prevent fraud is to ensure that due diligence is conducted on 





 Chapter 3 




 Page 50  LAC/19-1 Department of Commerce 
Unresponsiveness 
DOC staff received no response from 6 of the 20 grant recipients after 
attempts to contact the companies or a principal officer of the company were 
made. In three of these instances, mailed communication was returned as 
undeliverable; however, in one case, a letter that was sent to the personal 
address of the CEO of a grant recipient was returned as refused. 
 
When asked why the Coordinating Council did not seek legal action against 
these companies, a DOC staff member informed us that the legal costs could 
outweigh any repayment that the Coordinating Council would receive. In 
addition, the Coordinating Council has not sought repayment by using a 
collection agency because it is an unsecured creditor, and staff believe that 





State economic development grants are provided to public and privately-
held companies using taxpayer money. Thus, information should be 
available to taxpayers when grant recipients fail to meet job and investment 
requirements, and when the recipients meet or exceed the requirements. 
As stated in Chapter 2, if a company received an incentive and closed, 
executed a mass layoff, or filed for bankruptcy, the public should know if 




Recommendations  18. The S.C. Department of Commerce should begin reporting on the 
amount of clawbacks that have been issued, received, and balance due 
by grant recipients in its annual report. 
 
19. The S.C. Department of Commerce should begin reporting the 
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Audits of JDC 
Recipients 
 
Some officials at the S.C. Department of Commerce stated that the Job 
Development Credit (JDC) program is risk-free due, in part, to the fact that 
the S.C. Department of Revenue (DOR) is statutorily-required to audit all 
JDC recipients with claims over $10,000 in a calendar year at least once 
every three years. However, DOR is unable to complete all statutorily-
required audits. Moreover, some companies that received JDCs have never 
been audited by DOR. 
 
S.C. Code §12-10-80(A)(11) requires DOR to audit each qualifying business 
with JDC claims in excess of $10,000 in a calendar year “at least once every 
three years to verify proper sources and uses of the funds.” DOR reports that 
its auditors have completed 15 to 29 audits per year over the past three 
calendar years, but there have been an average of 138 to 184 companies 
claiming JDCs over the past four years.  
 
 
Table 3.4: Number of JDC Claims 














* Due to a new audit system that was implemented in 2017, DOR does not have any 
information for either the number of audits completed or the number of companies claiming 





DOR is not completing all statutorily-required audits. A DOR official stated 
that a major reason for its inability to complete the statutory requirement is a 
lack of resources. As of October 2019, DOR only had two auditors 
conducting audits of JDCs and one audit manager. A DOR official stated 
that the agency was placing an emphasis on getting additional help with the 
program. In its response to the preliminary draft of this report, DOR stated 
that it would require approximately $389,576 for four full-time auditors in 
order to fulfill its statutory audits of JDCs. DOR proposes increasing the 
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Discrepancies in JDC 
Claims 
 
DOR staff informed us that discrepancies are found in JDC claims in up to 
95% of audits. Some types of discrepancies that are found include 
companies who do not adhere to the cap on JDCs that it can claim against 
each employee and companies claiming JDCs for unqualified 
(i.e., terminated) employees. DOR staff and DOC staff are conducting joint 
quarterly training sessions for companies to learn how to accurately 
calculate the number of JDCs they are eligible to claim, an action which 
may help reduce the number of discrepancies. 
 
 
Recommendation  20. The S.C. Department of Revenue should allocate resources so that the 
job development credit audit program is able to fulfill its statutorily-
required duty to audit each company claiming job development credits 
in excess of $10,000 in a calendar year, at least once every three years. 
 
 
JDC Compliance  Of the 415 projects that were approved for job development credits (JDCs) 
and had executed revitalization agreements from January 2009 through 
September 2019, we reviewed 18 to determine if DOC is effectively 
tracking JDC recipient compliance with revitalization agreements. We used 




Company Compliance  
Whenever JDCs are awarded to a project that is locating or expanding in 
South Carolina, the Coordinating Council enters into a revitalization 
agreement with the company undertaking the project. Revitalization 
agreements lay out the requirements that a company must meet before it 
can claim JDCs along with the requirements that a company must meet 
while claiming JDCs. We reviewed compliance with the requirements for 
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Due to taxpayer confidentiality statutes and our own enabling statutes, we 
were unable to verify that companies claiming JDCs were complying with 
all of the requirements in revitalization agreements, except for the supplier 
report requirement. The supplier report requirement in revitalization 
agreements states: 
 
Within thirty (30) days after execution of this 
Agreement, the Company shall provide the Council 
with a list of companies or persons that have supplied 
the Company with materials and services in excess of 
twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) since the 
commencement of the Project. This report shall 
include the name, address, and telephone number of 
the supplier company or person as well as a contact 
person for each supplier company and must be 
updated annually. 
 
Regarding this requirement we did not find any supplier reports in the 
files of the eight JDC projects in our sample that had the requirement. 
A DOC staff member stated that the supplier report requirement was 
originally added in the revitalization agreements as a means to get potential 
leads for further recruiting. However, companies were very resistant to 
supply the reports, and the Council did not receive many of the reports. The 
staff member stated that the Coordinating Council removed the requirement 
from the agreements because of resistance to the provision and the fact that 
the state received no real benefit from the reports it did receive. 
 
 
Hindrance of Taxpayer 
Confidentiality Statutes 
 
S.C. Code of Laws §2-15-61 and §12-54-240(A) prevent the LAC from 
obtaining information on tax returns from companies that are claiming 
JDCs. The two sections of law specifically state: 
 
S.C. Code of Laws §2-15-61: 
 
For the purposes of carrying out its audit duties under 
this chapter, the Legislative Audit Council shall have 
access to the records and facilities of every state 
agency during that agency's operating hours with the 
exception of reports and returns of the South Carolina 
S.C. Department of Revenue as provided in Sections 
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S.C. Code of Laws §12-54-240(A): 
 
Except in accordance with proper judicial order or as 
otherwise provided by law, it is unlawful for a person 
to divulge or make known in any manner any 
particulars set forth or disclosed in any report or 
return required under Chapters 6, 8, 11, 13, 16, 20, or 
36 or Article 17, Chapter 21 of this title. A person 
violating the provisions of this section is guilty of a 
misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be punished 
by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or by 
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. If 
the offender is an officer or an employee of the State, 
he must be dismissed from office and is disqualified 
from holding any public office in this State for a 
period of five years thereafter. If the offender is an 
officer or employee of a company retained by the 
State on an independent contract basis under 
subsection (B)(3) of this section or Section 12-4-350, 
the contract is immediately terminated and the 
company is not eligible to contract with the State for 
this purpose for a period of five years thereafter. 
 
The laws listed above hinder our ability to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
JDC program because we are prevented from knowing if a company has 
claimed any JDCs at all. If we do not know which specific companies have 
claimed JDCs, we cannot fully review whether the Coordinating Council is 
effectively tracking compliance with the JDC program. However, through 
interviews with DOC staff and DOR auditors, we found information that 
merits additional review. 
 
A DOC official stated that DOC relies on the “honor system” regarding the 
number of jobs and investment that a company claims it has created or made 
on quarterly status reports. This is concerning because companies could 
claim more JDCs than they are entitled to without proper verification of jobs 
created and investment made. Nevertheless, DOC officials told us multiple 
times that there is no risk to the state with the JDC program because 
companies can only claim credits against the jobs that the company has 
already created or investment that has already been made, and DOR audits 
all JDC recipients. 
 
However, as we discuss in Audits of JDC Recipients, many companies do 
not receive audits by DOR as statutorily-required. If the JDC recipients are 
not receiving statutorily-required audits, their job creation figures could be 
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While we could not review compliance with all requirements in the 
revitalization agreements, we found that there is a lack of communication 
between the Coordinating Council and DOR concerning the JDC program 
based upon the level of review DOR auditors actually conduct and what 
DOC staff believe the auditors conduct. Since more than $200 million in 
JDCs has been claimed by the 415 companies in the scope of our audit and 
JDCs represent a cost to the state in the form of lost revenue, we should be 
able to review all aspects of the program to ensure compliance with and 
effectiveness of the program while looking for ways to maximizing the 
value of the program to the state. 
 
 
Recommendations  21. The S.C. General Assembly should amend S.C. Code of Laws §2-15-61 
to give the Legislative Audit Council the authority to review reports and 
returns of the S.C. Department of Revenue when necessary to conduct 
audits. 
 
22. The Coordinating Council for Economic Development and the 
S.C. Department of Revenue should have better communication 
to ensure that all job development credit recipients are complying with 
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Chapter 4 
 
Evaluation of Proposed Incentive Projects 
 
 We examined DOC’s process for examining projects that have applied for 
grants or JDCs, DOC’s cost-benefit analysis model for determining the 
potential economic impact of the proposed projects, and DOC’s evaluation 
of the financial status of applicants for grants and JDCs. We found: 
 
 DOC’s cost-benefit analysis model was adopted in the mid-1990s and 
has not been updated to reflect current economic conditions. 
 Our analysis using updated economic conditions showed that the 
projected employment numbers of incentive recipients may have been 
inflated. 
 DOC uses a company’s estimate of its proposed number of new jobs 
when conducting cost-benefit analysis. 




Cost-Benefit Model  We reviewed the model used by DOC to estimate the economic and fiscal 
impacts of a proposed project. We evaluated the accuracy and 
appropriateness of the model, as well as the methodologies used by DOC 
in awarding economic incentives to a proposed project. We reviewed 
economic incentive programs offered by other Southeastern states, in 
addition to best practices for economic development work. We found: 
 
 The model used by DOC to estimate the economic and fiscal impacts of 
proposed projects has not been regularly updated to reflect current 
economic conditions.  
 All 32 impact analyses we reviewed indicated that DOC’s use of 
outdated data potentially inflated new employment numbers for 
companies seeking incentives and provided an inaccurate evaluation of 
the economic effects of a proposed project. 
 The model relies on job creation numbers provided by the prospective 
company with little documentation required to support the numbers and 
no research conducted by DOC to determine the feasibility of the 
numbers.  
 DOC’s process for determining which proposed projects receive 
economic incentives could be improved with the use of best practices, 
such as using economic modeling software. 
 DOC has not preserved institutional knowledge by documenting the 
process for conducting its economic impact analysis. 
 According to DOC, its cost-benefit model is conservative in estimating 
whether the costs to the state outweigh the benefits. 
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Economic Impact 
Analysis Model Outdated 
 
We reviewed the economic impact analysis model used by DOC to 
determine its effectiveness. The model used by DOC to estimate the 
economic and fiscal impacts of a proposed project is outdated. The State 
Budget and Control Board’s Board of Economic Advisors prepared the 
model, which was adopted 25 years ago in the mid-1990s.  
 
A DOC official acknowledged that the model is outdated and explained that 
conversations have been held with consultants, including the University of 
South Carolina (UofSC), about potential changes to the model. Upon being 
told that UofSC’s proposed model could take a month per project, DOC 
thought too much time and expense would be involved to adopt that model. 
The official stated that DOC has not looked at software as an option. 
 
DOC’s model uses some data related to economic conditions, which are 
constantly changing. For example, the model uses multipliers in its 
evaluation of a proposed project. The multiplier is the amount of direct and 
indirect payroll that would be generated in the state from $1 of new direct 
payroll. The multipliers are estimates which change every year based on 
spending patterns as determined from surveys conducted by the U.S. Bureau 
of Economic Analysis. DOC obtained the multipliers from a division of the 
State Budget and Control Board, now the S.C. Revenue and Fiscal Affairs 
Office (RFA), when the model was first adopted.  
 
DOC has not updated the multipliers used in its model to determine the 
economic and fiscal impacts of a proposed project since the model’s 
inception in the mid-1990s. DOC’s model also includes other variables, 
such as the average annual salary in South Carolina, the median county 
home value, and the inflation rate. DOC was not able to provide the date for 
the last time the numbers for those variables had been updated, but an 
agency official told us it has been a significant amount of time.   
 
DOC uses Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes in its impact 
analysis to identify the type of industry for the proposed project. However, 
the newest classification system is the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS), established in 1997 to replace the SIC 
system, which was considered to be insufficient. Although SIC codes are 
still widely used, NAICS codes provide more precise descriptions of the  
industry types. DOC’s analyses would provide better clarity for the types of 
industries considered for incentives with the use of NAICS codes. 
 
An official from RFA stated that, although the basic premise of the model 
is still valid, the economic analysis model used by DOC is outdated. 
The official stated the last update provided to DOC was 20 years ago, 
after the census, when there was a comprehensive change in home values.  
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The official stated that it would be best to incorporate economic changes 
every year, but DOC has not asked for many updates to the model. 
The official stated it would be best for an outside firm with specialized 
skills to assist DOC in updating its economic impact analysis. 
 
The RFA official also explained that the model was not designed to 
analyze the economic impact of providing incentives to professional sports 
teams. As recently publicized, DOC awarded incentives in 2019 to the 
Carolina Panthers, a professional football team, to move its headquarters to 
York County, South Carolina, which includes building a training facility 
there. As DOC pursues changes to its model, it should take into account 
situations that involve companies with special economic circumstances, 
such as professional sports teams. 
 
By not updating the multipliers and the other variables, which are subject to 
a changing economy, DOC is not accurately determining the economic and 
fiscal impact of a proposed project. Using outdated economic data could 
lead to DOC awarding incentives to projects that would have fewer 
estimated benefits to costs if the analyses were conducted using current data 
(see Economic Impact Analyses Yields Inaccurate Results). Since incentives 
generally should not be offered to proposed projects when the estimated 
costs outweigh the estimated benefits, it is imperative that DOC accurately 
analyze each proposed project for its economic impacts.  
 
According to DOC, the cost-benefit analysis model is conservative in 
estimating whether the costs to the state outweigh the benefits. Examples, 
as stated by DOC, include: 
 
 The state income and state cost estimates in the model are very 
conservative. 
 The only revenue in the model is derived from $.07 (equivalent to the 
state withholding tax) from every dollar of direct and indirect payroll. 
 State revenues generated by sales and use taxes, utility taxes, or any 
other revenues generated via the anticipated direct or indirect 
employment by the proposed project or the company itself, are not 
included in the model. 
 The model assumes every credit earned is used in the year it is earned for 
a period of 15 years. However, most companies recruited by DOC have 
no state income tax liability and cannot use many, if any, of these credits. 
So, while the model includes zero revenue from corporate income, it 
includes the cost of job tax credits as if every single credit earned is used, 
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Additionally, DOC stated that counties should, and generally do, evaluate 
the impact of economic development projects on their respective 
communities, as is required when entering into a fee-in-lieu of property 










We reviewed the economic impact analyses of 32 companies awarded 
incentives by DOC. DOC performed an impact analysis and gave it to 
the Coordinating Council to consider for approval of each application. 
Although DOC consistently performed an impact analysis for each 
company, we found that the data used in the analysis was outdated, 
yielding inaccurate results. 
 
In all 32 impact analyses we reviewed, DOC used outdated values for 
the average annual salary in South Carolina. We found the actual average 
annual salary in the state was significantly higher in each instance, 
with differences ranging from $10,444 to $16,614 when compared with 
the values used by DOC in its analyses. We included results from the last 
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Table 4.1:  
Average Salary Analysis,  










Spartanburg  2/17/2015  $39,570  $26,596  $12,974 
Aiken  6/25/2015  $39,570  $26,596  $12,974 
Dorchester  2/26/2016  $40,580  $26,596  $13,984 
Laurens  5/20/2016  $40,580  $26,596  $13,984 
Richland  12/1/2016  $40,580  $26,596  $13,984 
York  8/15/2017  $41,530  $26,596  $14,934 
Florence  11/16/2017  $41,530  $26,596  $14,934 
Lexington  12/5/2017  $41,530  $26,596  $14,934 
York  1/31/2018  $42,240  $26,596  $15,644 
Greenville  4/16/2018  $42,240  $26,596  $15,644 
Lancaster  6/6/2018  $42,240  $26,596  $15,644 
Lexington  7/26/2018  $42,240  $26,596  $15,644 
York  10/22/2018  $42,240  $26,596  $15,644 
Laurens  11/2/2018  $42,240  $26,596  $15,644 
Charleston  2/8/2019  $43,210  $26,596  $16,614 
Oconee  2/12/2019  $43,210  $26,596  $16,614 
Pickens  2/26/2019  $43,210  $26,596  $16,614 
York  4/8/2019  $43,210  $26,596  $16,614 
Spartanburg  5/16/2019  $43,210  $26,596  $16,614 
Lancaster  10/23/2019  $43,210  $26,596  $16,614 
 
*  The difference indicates LAC’s analysis found higher values than DOC's analysis. 
The values used by DOC resulted in inflated employment projections. 
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Recalculation of Impact 
Analyses 
 
We attempted to recalculate each economic impact analysis to determine 
how the use of accurate data would change the final result of the analysis, 
but DOC files did not contain sufficient documentation for a complete 
recalculation. However, we were able to partially recalculate the analyses. 
Using DOC’s template for the analyses, we inserted the accurate values for 
the average annual salary in the state according to the respective time 
period. We found all 32 analyses formerly conducted by DOC were 
inaccurate in the following components, which are used to determine the 
final result of the impact analyses, the cost-benefit ratio: 
 
 Employment Multiplier. 
 Indirect Employment. 
 Total Employment Impact. 
 
Table 4.2 shows the results of our partial comparison of economic impact 
analyses from a sample for the last five years. The projected employment 
impact determined by DOC was as much as 2,197 more jobs than the results 
of LAC’s analyses. DOC’s analyses were inaccurate, yielding higher 
employment multipliers and job creation numbers that made projects appear 
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Table 4.2:  
Employment Analysis,  


















Spartanburg  2/17/2015  0.33  192  192 
Aiken  6/25/2015  0.72  72  72 
Dorchester  2/26/2016  0.46  15  15 
Laurens  5/20/2016  0.38  13  13 
Richland  12/1/2016  1.06  106  106 
York  8/15/2017  0.43  233  233 
Florence  11/16/2017  1.66  582  582 
Lexington  12/5/2017  0.45  45  45 
York  1/31/2018  0.97  1,068  1,068 
Greenville  4/16/2018  0.78  15  15 
Lancaster  6/6/2018  0.91  95  95 
Lexington  7/26/2018  0.79  61  61 
York  10/22/2018  0.88  56  56 
Laurens  11/2/2018  0.86  37  37 
Charleston  2/8/2019  0.61  112  112 
Oconee  2/12/2019  0.68  68  68 
Pickens  2/26/2019  0.71  40  40 
York  4/8/2019  14.65  2,197  2,197 
Spartanburg  5/16/2019  0.46  51  51 
Lancaster  10/23/2019  0.71  708  708 
 
*  The difference indicates DOC’s analysis found higher values than LAC’s analysis.  
 
**  The employment multiplier is the amount of direct and indirect payroll that would be 
generated in the state from one dollar of new direct payroll. The values used by DOC 
resulted in inflated employment projections. 
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Median Home Values  
We also found that DOC used outdated data for another component of the 
impact analysis, the median home value in the county of the project. Of the 
four counties we reviewed, we found median home values in the respective 
time period were actually as much as $197,225 higher than the values used 
by DOC in its analyses. Each of the four counties had higher actual median 
home values than those used by DOC as shown in Table 4.3. 
  
 
Table 4.3: Median Home Values  
 
*The difference indicates LAC’s analysis found higher values than DOC’s analysis. 
 
Sources: DOC, RFA, and LAC Analysis 
 
 
The county median home values factor into DOC’s impact analysis in 
multiple areas. Using outdated data affects the final result of the analysis, 
providing an inaccurate evaluation of the economic effects of a proposed 
project by inflating the cost-benefit ratio, a determination of whether the 
benefits from the project outweigh the costs involved.  
 
DOC’s use of outdated data caused its impact analyses to be inaccurate, 
yielding inflated employment projections for proposed projects. Therefore, 










Charleston  $295,600  $98,375  $197,225 
Fairfield  $92,500  $61,014  $31,486 
Marion  $77,800  $56,848  $20,952 
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Job Creation Numbers  
The DOC cost-benefit model relies on job creation numbers provided by the 
prospective company in its application with little documentation required to 
support the company’s estimated job numbers. According to a DOC official, 
the agency does not conduct research regarding the feasibility of the 
numbers provided in the applications. The official noted that the company is 
required to certify that information in the application is correct to the best of 
its knowledge. Since companies submitting proposed projects are seeking 
incentives, it is possible that companies could inflate the number of jobs to 
be created in order to obtain more favorable incentives.  
 
A DOC official noted that the agency reviews financial statements of 
applicants, but takes risks, especially in rural counties. Better documentation 
of the number of jobs to be created, the use of industry standards, and 
DOC’s own judgment may better determine if the job projections appear to 
be reasonable. This is particularly important since DOC uses the job 
creation number from the company in its impact analysis as well as in press 
releases regarding the incentives. 
 
 





Some of the issues we examined above regarding the 2019 incentives 
awarded to the Carolina Panthers professional football team were addressed 
by Dr. Rebecca Gunnlaugsson, an economist who specializes in public 
finance and taxation. Dr. Gunnlaugsson noted potential problems with the 
cost-benefit analysis for the Panthers’ project. DOC responded to 
Dr. Gunnlaugsson’s concerns. Dr. Gunnlaugsson’s concerns and DOC’s 
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Table 4.4: Comparison of 
Dr. Gunnlaugsson’s Analysis to 
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We contacted the commerce departments in several Southeastern states to 
request information regarding the process for conducting an economic 
analysis for proposed projects. However, Maryland was the only state to 
provide a response.  
Maryland’s General Assembly prescribes the methodology for commerce’s 
cost-benefit analysis. Maryland uses the IMPLAN model for its analysis. 
Clawback (recovery) provisions vary from a prorated clawback to a full 
recovery in the event of fraud. Maryland’s Department of Commerce is 
required to submit annual job reports to the legislature and governor 
detailing job creation status by incentive program. Maryland’s General 
Assembly has a Tax Credit Evaluation Committee that reviews the tax 
credits and makes recommendations for revisions as necessary. Although 
we requested it, Maryland did not share its economic impact analysis model 
with us. 
 
Best Practices  
A professor at UofSC with expertise in economic analysis informed us that 
economic modeling software is a critically important tool when conducting 
an economic impact analysis. The professor explained the amount of the 
investment to be spent in the state needs to be considered when conducting 
an analysis for proposed projects. The economist noted that IMPLAN 
software uses regional purchase coefficients for the inflow and outflow of 
goods in a region. This would take into consideration how much money is 
projected to be spent locally. 
DOC’s analysis of proposed projects could be improved by researching the 
types of available software, such as IMPLAN or REMI, and adopting the 
use of the software with the best fit. The software uses mathematical 
equations to apply national data on inter-industry input-output linkages to 
states and localities, calibrating the multipliers based on the area. DOC 
should examine the utility of economic modeling software in order to 
determine whether it can be used to better analyze proposed projects for 
awarding economic incentives.  
A study conducted in 2010 by the School of Government at the University 
of North Carolina-Chapel Hill found that complex, large-scale projects 
might justify the hiring of an external consultant. An external consultant 
would have more expertise and provide an independent analysis of the 
proposed project. 
We also found that the Microsoft® Office Excel spreadsheets used in DOC’s 
impact analysis lacked column headings to properly identify the data.  
Detailed instructions, including proper headings for data, are important for 
documenting DOC’s process in order to maintain institutional knowledge.  
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23. The S.C. Department of Commerce should adopt and implement a 
policy to annually update the model used to estimate the costs and 
benefits of a proposed project. 
 
24. The S.C. Department of Commerce should maintain records for all of 
the components used in its impact analyses for proposed projects. 
 
25. The S.C. Department of Commerce should consider using the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) in its economic 
impact model to identify the type of industry for the proposed project. 
 
26. The S.C. Department of Commerce should consider hiring an external 
firm with specialized skills to assist in updating its economic impact 
analysis. 
 
27. The S.C. Department of Commerce should take into consideration 
companies with special economics, such as professional sports teams, 
when evaluating incentive awards. 
 
28. The S.C. Department of Commerce should require sufficient 
documentation be submitted with the application that would support 
the number of projected jobs to be created.   
 
29. The S.C. Department of Commerce should review the applications to 
compare the number of jobs to be created with industry standards to 
ensure feasibility.  
 
30. The S.C. Department of Commerce should use economic impact 
modeling software to evaluate proposed projects. 
 
31. The S.C. Department of Commerce should consider hiring an external 
consultant to evaluate complex, large-scale prospective projects. 
 
32. The S.C. Department of Commerce should add identifiers 
(column headings) to Microsoft® Office Excel spreadsheets used 
in its impact analysis. 
 
33. The S.C. Department of Commerce should have a written manual 
detailing the process for conducting the impact analysis in order to 
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We reviewed the Coordinating Council’s processes for vetting JDC and 
grant applicants, which includes a review of the financial status of 
applicants. We found that the Coordinating Council: 
 
 Has made a positive change to its vetting process for JDC and grant 
applicants by adding special stipulations to its agreements with 
companies. 
 Needs to require multiple years of audited financial data, when available, 
for an applicant of incentives, especially when a company does not have 
a strong financial status. 
 Needs to conduct fraud risk assessments for projects seeking grant funds. 
 Needs to be presented with applications by all companies who complete 
an application and pay the applicable fee for discretionary incentives. 




Process of Determining 
Economic Viability 
 
When a company applies for grants or JDCs that must be approved by the 
Coordinating Council for Economic Development, the company is required 
to include financial statements to show that the project is economically 
viable. Based upon the provided financial documents, DOC staff conduct a 
financial assessment that includes a summary of project costs, proposed 
financing, and a high-level overview of the financial state of the applicant. 
 
DOC staff stated that they primarily look for negative numbers, such as 
negative net income, negative working capital, or an excessive debt-to-
worth ratio when reviewing a company’s financial documents. However, our 
review of a sample of projects approved for grants and JDCs found 7 of the 
13 grant recipients and 3 of the 18 JDC recipients were approved for 
incentives despite having negative net income, negative working capital, or 
high debt-to-worth ratios. In addition, the staff typically provide cursory 
notes such as, “Despite its net loss in 2013, the company is growing and 
should have sufficient financial support for this project,” when explaining 
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The financial assessment should contain more information on how certain 
negative financial figures might affect the outcome of the project. 
Furthermore, if a company’s financial status is questionable, the 
Coordinating Council should require additional years of financial statements 
to more effectively determine if a negative financial figure is due to an 







Grant applications require financial statements to be included with the 
application before it will be processed. The options of acceptable financial 
statements listed on the grant application include annual reports, 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reports, or audited 
financial statements. However, our review of grant and JDC files found 
several projects that did not have any supporting financial statements. 
We were informed by DOC staff that privately-held companies are hesitant 
to allow the Coordinating Council to keep its financial documents on file. 
Thus, privately-held companies will sometimes visit the Coordinating 
Council in person with their financial documents for the DOC staff to 
review without having to submit copies of the financial documents. 
 
A more thorough financial review of privately-held companies needs to be 
conducted by DOC staff. Many publicly-traded companies, in contrast to 
privately-held companies, are required to have audited financial statements 
and submit reports on a regular basis to the SEC. These documents are often 
readily available to the public.  
 
A Coordinating Council official stated that while the Coordinating Council 
prefers to receive audited financial statements, companies do not always 
have these documents available. The only companies that might not have 
audited financial statements are those not regulated by the SEC (i.e., most 
privately-held companies). When asked if it requested tax returns for these 
companies, DOC staff responded that the Coordinating Council prefers not 
to receive those because companies typically try to show as little income as 
possible in order to have a low tax bill. 
 
Consequently, the Coordinating Council allows privately-held companies to 
use unaudited financial documents that are not subject to an audit by the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to obtain state grant funds. Privately-held 
companies should be held to the same standards as publicly traded 
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While there have only been three known cases of fraud involving companies 
that received incentives approved by the Coordinating Council, all three 
companies were privately-held. The Coordinating Council should require all 
companies, regardless of whether they are publicly-traded or not, to submit 
audited financial statements, reports and returns that are subject to audit by 
the IRS and SEC, or verified bank statements and/or loan guarantees as 






Included in all grant performance agreements is the stipulation that no state 
grant funds will be disbursed until the approval of a project’s expenditures, 
through submission of invoices and proof of payment to the grantee 
(i.e., the county government of project’s location). This means that grants 
approved by the Coordinating Council are a reimbursement to companies 
rather than an upfront advance. In theory, the stipulation helps ensure that 
grant funds are used for the intended purpose. 
 
In situations in which a company’s financials are questionable or are not 
available (as may be the case for a start-up company), the Coordinating 
Council can put special stipulations on companies before grant funds are 
dispersed. For example, one company in our sample was a start-up company 
that sought grant funds to help construct a building that was to be over 
100,000 square feet. Since the Coordinating Council was not provided with 
audited financial documents, it required the company to complete 
construction of the building and submit a certificate of occupancy in the 
grant performance agreement before funds would be disbursed. 
 
Along with the aforementioned company, which was the only company in 
our sample that had a special stipulation included in its grant performance 
agreement, we attended a meeting of the Coordinating Council in 
December 2019. At that meeting, the Coordinating Council put a special 
stipulation on another company due to its financial status. Special 
stipulations are a relatively recent addition to performance agreements; a 
Coordinating Council official informed us that the Coordinating Council has 
only started using them in the past three or four years. That official informed 
us that special stipulations were implemented in response to previous grant 
recipients who were convicted of fraud or filed bankruptcy after receiving 
grant funds. 
 
Special stipulations can help provide an extra safeguard of taxpayer money, 
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If the Coordinating Council required additional information, it could make a 
more informed decision of when special stipulations should be used. 
Currently, grant applications require companies to submit proposed project 
funding, historical information on the company, and categories and wage 
rates for new jobs, among other things.   
 
However, requiring grant applicants to provide the following information 
(that the Coordinating Council already requires JDC applicants to provide) 
would further help the Coordinating Council in its decision-making process: 
 
 A listing of all of the principal officers of the company. 
 Information on whether the company or any principal officer has ever 
been convicted of any criminal offense other than a motor vehicle 
violation. 
 Information on whether the company or any principal officer has ever 
been in receivership or adjudicated a bankruptcy. 
 Information on whether the company or any principal officer has ever 
been denied a business-related license or had it suspended or revoked by 
any administrative, governmental, or regulatory agency. 
 
 
Risk Avoidance  
Providing financial incentives to companies is inherently risky. Even when 
incentives are performance based, meaning that a company must meet 
certain requirements such as a minimum investment or minimum job 
threshold before incentives are awarded, taxpayer money is still being 
provided to private and publicly-traded companies. A DOC staff member 
informed us that the Coordinating Council is willing to take more risks for 
companies that are looking to locate in rural communities because it is more 
difficult to get companies to locate in those areas. 
 
We recognize that the incentive award process must consider many factors 
aside from just a company’s financial status. In addition, we recognize that 
the Coordinating Council needs discretion to approve incentives for 
companies that, despite a riskier financial situation, are willing to locate in 
areas where attracting employers is more difficult than in other counties. 
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Fraud Risk 
The Coordinating Council does not currently conduct a fraud risk 
assessment when vetting projects. While there have been only three known 
cases of fraud involving companies that received incentives approved by 
the Coordinating Council during the scope of our audit, each of the 
three companies were approved for grants of at least $1 million. 
The Coordinating Council can implement a fraud risk assessment as 
part of the vetting process for a project to deter fraud from occurring again. 
 
In its response to our preliminary draft, DOC stated that a federal agent 
investigating the latest case of fraud acknowledged that one of the instances 
of fraud would have occurred no matter what system was in place and that 
smart criminals will find a way to cheat the system. However, it is 
impossible to measure the efficacy of a fraud detection system if one does 
not exist. DOC staff believe the financial assessment that they conduct 
protects against fraud, but a fraud risk assessment should look at more than 
just a project’s financials. It should examine the likelihood that fraud has, 
or will, occur based upon grant fraud indicators.  
 
According to a 2012 report compiled by representatives of federal Offices of 
the Inspectors General, grant fraud indicators include: 
 
 Organizations with an ineffective or unqualified Board of Directors. 
 A grant project that by its design or purpose is difficult to assess or 
track. 
 A grant recipient’s lack of proper internal controls, such as separation of 
duties, or unsupervised use of checking accounts, cash, debit, or credit 
cards that does not require supervisory approval. 
 Organizations that have personnel with excessive debt or gambling 
issues, or employees that clearly live outside their means. 
 Organizations that engage in transactions that are less than 
“arm’s length” indicating there may be a bargain or gift element, 
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We attempted to review files for projects that were denied DOC staff that 
it does not have a list or any files for denied projects because they would not 
bring projects before the Coordinating Council unless DOC staff 
recommends approval. In essence, the decision on whether a project will 
receive discretionary economic development incentives in South Carolina is 
decided by a few DOC staff members. A member of the Coordinating 
Council informed us that they could not remember any project ever being 
denied that was brought before the Coordinating Council. 
 
The current decision-making process for discretionary economic 
development incentives is not transparent and leaves little accountability 
from independent, oversight organizations. During Coordinating Council 
meetings, even though much of the discussion on the merits of a project 
occurs in executive session, there is still an open voting process where the 
public can find out which projects will or will not receive taxpayer funds. 
Furthermore, independent, oversight organizations, such as the LAC, 
have the ability to sit-in on executive session meetings to assess the validity 
of the process. 
 
While the DOC staff present all grant and JDC applications to the 
Coordinating Council, the staff does not make the applications available to 
the general public. In fact, the staff will only provide grant or JDC 
applications to companies for which the Secretary will recommend 
approval. While the Secretary has the authority to recommend approval of 
projects, opening up applications to all business who meet program 
eligibility requirements, and presenting the completed applications with a 
paid fee to the Coordinating Council for a public vote, would provide 





 Chapter 4 




 Page 75  LAC/19-1 Department of Commerce 
Recommendations  34. The Coordinating Council for Economic Development should require 
applicants to show multiple years of financial data, when available, to 
gain a more complete picture of the applicant’s financial state. 
 
35. The Coordinating Council for Economic Development should require 
all applicants for grants to submit audited financial statements, reports 
and returns subject to review by the Internal Revenue Service or the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, or verified bank statements 
and/or loan guarantees as proof of a project’s financial wherewithal. 
 
36. The Coordinating Council for Economic Development should require 
additional information from grant applicants in order to make a more 
informed decision of when special stipulations should be used on risky 
projects. 
 
37. The Coordinating Council for Economic Development should conduct a 
fraud risk assessment for each project seeking discretionary grant funds. 
 
38. The Coordinating Council for Economic Development should provide 
applications for job development credits and discretionary grants to all 
businesses who meet program eligibility requirements, regardless of 
whether the Secretary of the S.C. Department of Commerce will 
recommend approval. 
 
39. The Coordinating Council for Economic Development should keep 
records of all projects that were denied discretionary incentives by the 
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Appendix A 
 
2020 County Classification for the 
Job Development Credit 
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Appendix B 
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Source: S.C. Department of Commerce Revitalization Agreements with Job Development Credit Projects. 
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Appendix C 
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Appendix D 
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Appendix E 
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Appendix F 
 
Excerpt from Virginia Incentive Tracking Website 
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Appendix G 
 
Example of a Job Verification Document 
Submitted by a Grant Recipient 
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Henry McMaster SOUTH CAROLINA  Robert M. Hitt III 
 Gover nor  D EPA R T M ENT  O F  CO MM ER C E  Sec r et a r y   
 
1201 Main Street, Suite 1600, Columbia, SC  29201 USA  
tel:  (803)737-0400  ·  fax:  (803)737-0418  ·  www.sccommerce.com 
 
 
June 4, 2020 
 
 
Mr. K. Earle Powell 
South Carolina General Assembly 
Legislative Audit Council 
1331 Elmwood Avenue, Suite 315 
Columbia, South Carolina 29201 
 
RE: A Review of S.C. Department of Commerce Incentive Programs  
 
Dear Director Powell: 
 
Thank you for giving the South Carolina Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) an 
opportunity to respond to the above referenced report. My understanding is that your staff was 
very professional in its dealings with my staff during the course of the investigation by the 
Legislative Audit Council (“LAC”) of, primarily, the effectiveness of discretionary incentive 
programs administered by the South Carolina Coordinating Council for Economic Development 
(the “Coordinating Council”). 
 
The LAC’s report is very thorough and demonstrates significant effort by your staff to 
understand and evaluate the processes related to discretionary incentives and to make 
recommendations on how Commerce and the Coordinating Council might be able to improve 
those processes. While we may not agree with how the LAC chose to analyze the data in 
portions of the report, the analysis is very detailed as are the recommendations, which are 
many.  
 
Significantly, the LAC acknowledges in the report summary that the two primary incentives 
provided to Commerce and the Coordinating Council by the South Carolina General Assembly 
have been very effective. The LAC states that certified job development credit (JDC) projects 
have met 100% of their collective job creation goals and that the 248 (out of 557) grants that 
are closed, pending closeout or in maintenance have collectively met 92% of their job creation 
requirements and exceeded minimum investment requirements by $1.8 billion. The LAC’s 
primary criticism is that Commerce should be measuring actual job creation in excess of 
contractual commitments to better demonstrate effectiveness of these incentive programs. 
 
These performance results are a significant factor in the overwhelming economic development 
success that our state enjoyed during the 10-year period analyzed. With a team-first approach 
and using the very tools the LAC audited, South Carolina saw some pretty remarkable growth. 
Before the COVID-19 global health crisis changed the world, our state’s budget estimate for the 
2020-2021 fiscal year was $10.1 billion, an increase of almost 98% - nearly doubling since 2011 - 
and with a $1.9 billion expected surplus. In that same period, the budget estimate for state 
income tax revenue expanded by over 75%. And, from 2014 through 2019, South Carolina state 
income tax collections grew on average 6.6% each year. This happened without a tax increase. 
It was all due to growth, including new jobs and wage increases for our families. 
 
Additionally, and also during the period of the LAC audit, one of the pillars of our economy - 
manufacturing - saw employment growth of more than 16%. Gross wages for goods-producing 
jobs increased by $1 billion annually for the last five years. In total, these wages, including full 
benefits, grew from $16 billion to more than $20 billion. Broadly speaking, there were more 
South Carolinians working at the end of 2019 than previously on record, and they were working 
with higher wages.  
 
If only we could turn back the clock. Today, South Carolina may be in a better starting position 
than many other states because of our sustained economic development success, but our state, 
like the rest of the nation and the world, is facing historic unemployment and unprecedented 
economic challenges. We do not yet know the extent of the damage as we continue the process 
of restarting our economy and getting South Carolinians back to work. Commerce is actively 
engaged with the Governor, members of the General Assembly, other agencies and private 
sector businesses to develop strategies for moving forward. We may need new and entirely 
different tools to address the current and, in some cases, overwhelming needs of our citizens 
and our existing businesses. What we will not need is more bureaucracy. 
 
Despite the LAC’s acknowledgement of the overall effectiveness of our discretionary incentive 
programs, many of the LAC’s recommendations translate into exactly that—more bureaucracy, 
with more cost, but minimal benefit. The LAC may not fully appreciate how Commerce’s 
relationship and interaction with prospective companies plays a key role in attracting economic 
development projects that could locate anywhere. If Commerce cannot sell South Carolina as 
business-friendly, our incentive programs never come into play. Commerce is the face of our 
state to the global business world, so compelling your chief recruiter to be more bureaucratic 
may undermine Commerce’s effectiveness. There has to be a balance with public 
accountability, which is extremely important, and not creating unnecessary burden that is 




 The LAC recommends that the Coordinating Council not rely on certifications by 
companies regarding job creation and investment performance that are supported by 
payroll and property tax records, even though tax filings to the Internal Revenue Service 
and to the South Carolina Department of Revenue (DOR) are similarly self-reported, 
subject to audit and penalties for noncompliance and/or false reporting. (Instead of 
requiring Commerce and/or the Coordinating Council effectively to tell businesses who 
certify (with documentation) to their performance that “we don’t believe you”, we 
would support the LAC’s recommendation that DOR perform more audits and are in 
favor of raising fees for DOR to add staff.) 
 
 The LAC states that “DOC and the Coordinating Council do not have sufficient 
performance measures regarding the effectiveness of the JDC and grant programs” even 
though the LAC acknowledges the overall effective performance of these discretionary 
incentive programs.1 If the programs are working as intended by the General Assembly, 
is it necessary to allocate more state resources to measure performance? 
 
 The LAC recommends that Commerce report “forgone tax revenue due to the claiming 
of job development credits.” (DOR and Commerce have informed the LAC that the DOR 
already includes JDC claims in its annual reporting.)2  
 
 The LAC report states: “While there have only been three known cases of fraud 
involving companies that received incentives approved by the Coordinating Council 
[over the 10-year review period], all three companies were privately-held. The 
Coordinating Council should require all companies, regardless of whether they are 
publicly traded or not, to submit audited financial statements, reports and returns that 
are subject to audit by the IRS and SEC, or verified bank statements and/or loan 
guarantees as proof of a project’s financial wherewithal.” Report at p. 71. The cost of 
such a requirement would be prohibitive for smaller or new companies, and this 
recommendation does not acknowledge that these types of companies typically are 
approved only for JDCs (which a company only receives if it performs as promised) or 
grants with extra stipulations requiring achievement of certain investment and/or job 
creation thresholds before any grant funds may be disbursed. 
 
 The LAC recommends that the Coordinating Council undertake much more detailed 
fraud risk assessment with regard to companies benefiting from grants even though the 
LAC recognizes that only three out of 557 grants awarded over 10 years (two under a 
former secretary) involved fraud (or some evidence of misuse of grant funds).3 All three 
                                               
1 The LAC states in its report summary that certified JDC projects have met 100 percent of their collective job 
creation goals and that the 248 (out of 557) grants that are closed, pending closeout, or in maintenance have 
collectively met 92 percent of their job creation requirements and exceeded minimum investment requirements 
by $1.8 billion. 
2 While Commerce believes aggregate JDC claims should be reported (as they are by DOR), we do take issue with 
the characterization of JDCs as “forgone tax revenue”. Governor Campbell in the defense of discretionary state and 
local tax incentives was known for his view that “half of nothing is nothing.” In the absence of the new jobs and 
investment, the state gets nothing, so there is no revenue foregone. 
3 Additionally, as the LAC acknowledged in the report, a federal agent investigating one of the three grants at issue 
advised that there was nothing Commerce or the Coordinating Council could have done to protect itself from a 
smart, sophisticated criminal determined to perpetuate fraud. 
grants were also in Marion County, a county with persistently higher unemployment 
than the rest of the state and where legislative leadership has consistently advised 
Commerce that the agency should take more risk, if necessary, to attract jobs and 
investment to these areas. 
 
There are other portions of the LAC report that we disagree with but in the interest of brevity 
will not discuss here. However, I am compelled to challenge the LAC’s recommendation that 
“[t]he Coordinating Council for Economic Development should provide applications for job 
development credits and discretionary grants to all businesses who meet program eligibility 
requirements, regardless of whether the Secretary of Commerce will recommend approval.”  
 
With all due respect to the LAC, if we simply allow any qualifying business to apply for 
discretionary incentives, then there is no need for South Carolina to have a Department of 
Commerce with an experienced professional staff.4 I sincerely believe that our results speak for 
themselves. Doubling the state budget over the last 10 years and an almost $2 billion surplus 
anticipated prior to the COVID-19 pandemic did not just magically happen. That was the result 
of robust economic activity. Our hope is that the General Assembly recognizes the value 
Commerce has provided and will provide through our ongoing efforts to restart South 
Carolina’s economy and return to the prosperity to which we have been accustomed. 
 
There are certainly portions of the LAC report that we agree with, notably, that the cost-benefit 
model used by the Coordinating Council needs updating. Accordingly, we will carefully review 
the many recommendations the LAC has made on how Commerce can improve what we do. 
We embrace improvement where it makes sense and where benefits outweigh costs. 
 
Again, I would like to thank the LAC for courteous treatment of my staff and its effort to identify 
areas where Commerce can improve. We may not agree on everything, but we certainly can 
agree that self-review and analysis are always beneficial. We are in the process of implementing 
(or already have implemented) some of the recommendations that we believe are helpful and 
will look forward to guidance from the General Assembly with regard to recommendations that 






Robert M. Hitt III 
 
RMHIII/km 
                                               
4 An unintended consequence of allowing any business to apply for discretionary incentives is the likelihood that 
Commerce’s very low incidence of fraud or misused grant funds—only three grants out of 557 over 10 years—
would go up substantially. This result would undermine the LAC’s recommendations concerning fraud prevention, 
which we disagree with because cost of implementation far exceeds any actual or perceived benefit.  
